1. Anyone dealing professionally with the topic better not check most of the answers in the thread (either downright xenophobic or hardly advanced on Gibbon in the 18th c). So here's a brief thread on an often overlooked factor in "The Fall of Rome": Internal violence.
2. The question by Steven is at least neatly formulated. But let's fine-tune it a bit more. After all, Justinian restored Imperial authority over several western regions (including the city of Rome), which in some cases lasted several centuries. In Apulia even half a millennium!
3. What we are ultimately dealing with is the dissolution of western Roman _emperorship_ This is something that will disappear by the end of the fifth century, never to return. When we talk about "the Fall of Rome", this is what is really at stake. So what happened?
4. We should appreciate there's a fundamental shift in the nature of Late Roman emperorship in the crucial period of c. 375-395. Since the 260s, the primary role of the emperor was that of an adult traveling soldier-emperor. This is why there was no real capital c. 280s-380s.
5. This was a direct consequence of the "crisis of the third century", with political power shifting to Gaul, the Danubian provinces and the Levant. Emperors had to see both to the defense of these regions and cater to their stakeholders (armies and local aristocracies).
6. Even with the rise of Sassanian Persia and the formation of slightly more formidable new barbarian entities (e.g. Franks, Goths etc), the largest threat to Roman Emperors was always and remained... other Roman Emperors. Curbing usurpation and civil war was a top priority.
7. Diocletian's solution of entrenching shared Imperial rule certainly helped and this system held for more of the 4th century. Civil wars remained but certainly less frequent. But the new system was not without risks, most evident in the cases of Julian in 363 and Valens in 378.
8. In both cases the emperor died in battle without a clear successor. This exacerbated existing crises in the east. It is perhaps for such reasons that we see a new shift of emperorship: from traveling soldier emperors to ceremonial palace emperors. Or... we get child-emperors..
9. Four western emperors who became "senior" Augustus, did so respectively at the ages of 16 in 375, 12 in 383, 10 in 395 and 6 in 425. This means most 'legitimate' emperors for the period c. 375-455 were not directly in control of their governments at the start of their reign.
10. In this constellation, a new system of power-broking eventually emerged between the most dominant senior commander at court (a magister militum ) and the senatorial aristocracy of Italy. This made sense because government had to continue. But it also came with hidden costs.
11. This system originated c. 375-395, during which one emperor was toppled, another committed suicide, and two more usurpers vanquished in civil wars. The western army by 395 probably had suffered just as much as eastern army after Adrianople in 378. It rarely got a break later.
12. Precisely because 'generalissimos' did not have same legitimacy as reigning emperors, they depended on support of other stakeholders such as Italy's senatorial aristocracy (who often held the top civilian offices in government). This had immediate dire fiscal repercussions.
13. Senators were unwilling to either have their farmers drafted as recruits for the army (as clearly seen in legislation of the late 390s) OR contribute to the taxation required to help support the army (as clearly seen in legislation of the 440s). Stark contrast with the East!
14. When major political and military crises occur, as they did especially after 406 with the collapse of the Rhine frontier, usurpations in Gaul and Alaric's mutinies, it undermines a generalissimo like Stilicho's options to intervene decisively. And he did try his best.
15. It is here where we see clear difference with peak of the crisis of the third century. In many ways this was originally more dire (think Gallienus' reign). Yet emperors where expected to take charge and intervene, as they did. The system set in place by 408 prevented that.
16. Not being the emperor, also meant that men like Stilicho were more vulnerable to internal opposition in times of such crisis. Already during his tenure we see regional commanders experimenting with violent opposition without usurpation: warlordism. https://shorturl.at/aJ9qb
17. This is a game-changer. For four centuries, the main path of opposition was trying to become emperor yourself. After the reign of Honorius this virtually disappears. By 432, two warlords will fight a civil war to become generalissimo not emperor. The office had lost value.
18. Taking down a generalissimo, meant at least that the emperor remained safe (usually). But in the process the western court lost their aspirations on a monopoly on violence. And a big point of emperorship coming into being under Augustus was keeping military violence in check!
19. Setbacks against the "barbarians", such as Alaric's sack of Rome in 410, or Geiseric's conquest of the African provinces from the late 420s onwards, could never have advanced as much as they did, if it weren't for critical infighting to topple generalissimos at the same time.
20. Only by 455, there was a serious effort to make emperorship the primary vehicle of Imperial leadership again. But at that point, the western Roman taxbase had effectively shrunk to Italy, southern Gaul and threatened areas in Eastern Spain, Dalmatia and Sicily. Crises galore.
21. At this point, there will be almost annual conflicts with Geiseric who rules over the rich African provinces _and_ provincial civil wars with the Italic field army's (=essentially _the_ western Roman army now) leadership who want to prioritize the defense of their own region.
22. By the 470s, some people (e.g. Gundobad) did not even consider the position of dominant magister militum in Italy worth it anymore. The downward spiral of internal violence had to stop. Hence Odoacer's solution: no more appointing western emperors = no more civil war.
23. For now... the end... As I've mentioned elsewhere, I hope to have all of this down in far greater detail for a monograph on "Rome's Disintegration. War, Violence, and the End of Empire in the West" for Oxford University Press. To be finished next year.
PS: If people want to compare and contrast the vastly different fates of the Imperial West (disintegration) and the Imperial East (resilience), I did a follow-up thread here: https://x.com/_Dragases_/statu...
@_Dragases_ Fantastic thread, too many laymen with political motivations seem to think Rome fell because it *wasn’t imperial enough* rather than the fall being a result of the failures of that very same autocratic regime
@skytopjf That... is not an unfair assessment.
@_Dragases_ I’m so agree with you. Do you have a book where I can to deepen in the topics? Thnks!
@Tarta_ey I guess my Bonifatius book deals with a lot of this stuff! But do take into account that it's a decade old now, and did not yet incorporate all of the findings of my actual PhD on western Roman warlordism... That will go into the OUP book. https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/...
@_Dragases_ Possibly the empire declined into decadence thus becoming focussed on more trivial issues focused on personal ambition and pleasure and so failed to take the difficult measures required.
@NickBrownAuthor Good grief, no. No scholar worth the name has taken 'decadence' seriously in at least over a century. Even literary tropes of 'Decadence' in our sources overwhelmingly belong to the Principate, not the Later Roman Empire.
@_Dragases_ How do you have the energy to do this every three months, Jeroen?
@_Dragases_ The number 1 factor is germanic barbarians invading who although at various time foederatti, gained too much power, and not enough assimilation, leading to the collapse of the empire in the west. Anything else would've resulted in splinter states ala the palymrene and gallic emps
@_Plac3_hold3r *Taps the sign* https://x.com/_Dragases_/statu...