Chris - Perfectly Flawed Engineer

2/The authors’ conclusions is that NSW officers and enlisted should be commanding officers (COs) and command master chiefs (CMCs) in the fleet. They currently command/lead within their respective community. Those commands of NSW forces that have been engaged in combat.

3/But they suggest the fleet would allow the Navy to benefit from the combat experience and culture of its special-operations component and recapture the fighting edge. But do they understand the combat and operational requirements of today’s warship or submarine? I say no.

4/The Navy’s surface and sub forces operate in contested maritime environments. Sailors in leadership positions on those vessels have been trained and equipped to use their assigned vessel to conduct operations per their tactics, techniques, and procedures.

5/Conversely, NSW forces have done the same with their units. Do they hold any special qualifications that empower them to be “better” warfighters? Other than being special operations, I suggest no. Combat in different environments is significantly different.

6/Additionally, there is a HELL OF A LOT MORE than Warrior Ethos to running a warship or a submarine. The authors suggest integrating NSW officers into fleet commands, the Navy could revitalize its seagoing spirit, equipping the force with the leaders and warfighting culture.

7/But how long would it take to train NSW personnel in integrated air & missile defense systems and concepts? How about maintaining the material condition of ships? Damage control? Administration? Relationships with type commander, squadron commander, operational commander, etc.

8/I have no idea how to run a NSW command. They have no idea to run a warship or submarines. It’s not the same. War fighting in maritime environments is not apples and apples. It’s apples, oranges, bananas, plums, watermelon, and so on.

9/The authors state,”A NSW officer could command a special boat team, then a landing platform dock. A SEAL delivery team CO could go on to command a submarine outfitted for special operations support.” I can only speak of the warship perspective - a Landing Platform Dock (LPD)

10/The LPD is a 684 ft long warship designed to deliver components of a Marine Expeditionary Unit. To command such a vessels is a long apprenticeship in the surface navy. The aviation personnel sometimes assigned have also had some limited shipboard experience prior to command.

11/How will a NSW officer provide mentorship to the young naval officers who man the LPD? It’s more than just Warrior mentality. It’s being able to navigate and operate the ship. It’s also how to navigate the complexities of Navy personnel regimes. It’s not the same as a NSW unit

12/If the authors want to broaden the scope and impact of their NSW community within the larger framework of the US Navy’s maritime fleet, there are other ways.

13/NSW should expand their officers into carrier strike group staffs & fleet squadrons, fleet staffs, and joint commands that are outside their comfort zones and swim lanes. That would expose them to the fleet and get them notices by the Surface, Submarine, and Aviation partners.

NSW personnel should saddle up into the unsexy side of maritime combat operations. Take a turn at a fleet command. Learn how Big Navy™️ operates as a force. It’s more than adopting the can-do attitude & adaptive multidomain mindset to face peer adversaries. End

Post Script: Today US Navy surface forces are engaged in combat operations in the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea in vicinity of Yemen. That action is just as intense and dangerous as NSW combat operations, albeit very different. The authors should take that under consideration.