2/ Since early 2025, Russia's personnel losses have remained among the highest since the war began. But at the same time, Ukraine has faced a sharp rise in desertion and AWOL cases. The pace of Russian territorial advances is higher than during the same period in 2024.

3/ Each year follows a similar pattern: Russian forces form a pocket around a town, Ukraine cites manpower shortages and lack of aid, Russia takes heavy losses but advances, Ukraine inflates already high Russian casualty figures, while Moscow grossly downplays them

4/ Today, Russia is producing more drones, becoming increasingly organized, and gaining an edge, particularly in drone warfare, both in quantity and operational sophistication. The entire kill chain has improved, and training for drone operators has scaled

5/ Simultaneously, while force generation remains Moscow’s main advantage, coercion and abuse to mobilize people have increased sharply. More conscripts are pressured to sign contracts to avoid abuse, and far more arrested individuals are offered contracts to avoid criminal cases

6/ Russian troops largely doubt the war’s stated goals are achievable. Unlike Ukraine’s forces, Moscow enforces a strict punitive system with systematic extrajudicial punishments. While such cases have increased in the Ukrainian army since 2022–2023, they remain unsystematic

7/ A far bigger problem for Ukraine remains mobilization and growing dissatisfaction with mobilization methods. Although these incidents number in the hundreds, just a fraction of the tens of thousands involved, they receive outsized online coverage and attention.

8/ This narrative is amplified by Russian propaganda, but it’s also fair to note that the government’s response has often been inadequate. In several clear-cut cases, serious violations were publicly dismissed as Russian psyops or met with vague promises to investigate.

9/ In private conversations with TCK personnel, I was told that legally exempt individuals are sometimes mobilized to meet quotas. Once mobilized, they often launch legal proceedings to secure release- draining time and resources from the combat units who receive such dead weight

10/ Many changes, such as improved transfers, digitalization, data collection, and the shift to a corps structure, have led to tangible improvements. Ironically, I supported these reforms back in 2022–2023, when some dismissed them, arguing that it can't be done during a wartime

11/ Ukraine’s position in 2025 is better than I had anticipated last year. For example, I expected urban fighting in Pokrovsk to begin by late 2024 or early winter 2025 - but Russian forces have taken significantly more time to reach their current positions

12/ That said, constant self-reassurance that Ukraine is holding and Russia is on the verge of collapse is harmful. The front may stay static and advances slow, until the situation deteriorates to the point where Russia might seize thousands of square kilometers per month

13/ Of course, the opposite could happen - but counting on that while the balance shifts toward Russia isn’t a strategy. The West must apply real pressure to bring Moscow to the table, as it no longer takes empty threats seriously.

@Tatarigami_UA 🙄Unfortunately, the Ukrainian military cannot win until the Russian military's numbers are reduced to Zero.

@Tatarigami_UA Ive been saying the pro Westeners who've never been here who constantly make up stories about ru collapsing and riding on donkeys with shovels has been incredibly harmful, delusional and downright a slap in the face to the soldiers fighting. Its like they see the war for their

@Tatarigami_UA Your thread is very popular today! #TopUnroll https://threadreaderapp.com/th... 🙏🏼@KornikovaNina for 🥇unroll

@Tatarigami_UA What you mean by the balance is shifting towards Russia ?

@Tatarigami_UA Who are you Tatarigami ? I don't like your tone. You're missing a lot of points and you insist WAY too much on Ukraine's weaknesses What is your (hidden) agenda here ? 🤔

@Tatarigami_UA Quite off topic but according to your information how reliable does Yuri Butusov tend to be?

@Tatarigami_UA What’s the real story with Russia’s stocks of tanks for parts, munitions, etc? How far is Russia from exhausting their supplies of different categories of weapons and ammunition?

@Tatarigami_UA Ukraine needs to significantly increase its infantry numbers, that way you could give more R&R and rotations for whole units. Perhaps bring Zalushnyy back from London and put him in charge of military manpower?

@Tatarigami_UA What could I do to help? Being a south american middle to low class man with almost no resources?

@Tatarigami_UA @Tatarigami_UA What about russian tanks and IFVs? They almost completely disappeared from the battle field, yet production remains high. Any indications What they are being held back for (e.g. an armored breakthrough attempt or confrontation with NATO)?

@Tatarigami_UA SBU manpower shortages can be addressed by integrating PMCs and not just "foreign fighters". iirc a bill was in consideration early this year but I can't find anything.

@Tatarigami_UA Thanks Tatarigami for your honest assessment. This makes me very concerned and hoping that the US will finally tighten the screws.

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@Tatarigami_UA Informative as usual thanks

@Tatarigami_UA Sorry Ukraine