Published: August 10, 2025
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At Zolotyi Kolodyaz', Russia 🇷🇺 had first contact with Ukraine 🇺🇦's New Donbas Line, and its DRGs broke through it for the first time, with the Ukrainians suffering from catastrophic manpower shortages. In the long term, this might endanger all of Ukrainian-controlled Donbas. A

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2/🧵 The story starts on July 21th, when, according to DeepState, Russian DRGs were recorded east of Nove Shakhove. Everything has been kept quiet since then, with neither side releasing any information whatsoever, and with my sources, too, fully respecting operational silence.

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3/🧵 Let's break down the confusion on what exactly causes these breakthroughs. I identified 4 reasons: 1. Catastrophic manpower shortage in the Ukrainian ranks in this sector, initiating a loop of disorganized retreat ---> Russian breakthroughs ---> lengthening of the front

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4/🧵 2. Command incapacity. In this sector the Ukrainian command is reportedly "living on another world", and is very likely not giving orders, or sending Ukrainian forces into hopeless counterattacks with no planning whatsoever. Being the Ukrainian and Russian military culture

5/🧵 3. Extremely large amount of Russian resources committed to this direction, with rumours talking of about 100,000 troops just on the Pokrovsk sector. Most of these resources are currently attacking 24/7, which eventually exhausts Ukrainian drone crews, forcing them to

6/🧵 4. New Russian tactics. For about a month now, the Russians have been massively increasing DRG usage. These very small groups of 2-3 people are sent along very well planned routes with the hope of simply bypassing Ukrainian positions (which do not constitute a line, but

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7/🧵 Now for the damage assessment. 1. Russian forces consolidated positions over Line 0.5 at Hektova Balka, consisting of 1 barbed wire line, 1 anti-tank ditch, and 1 dragon's teeth line. 2. The zone of combat activity was expanded much further around the salient because of

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8/🧵 About point 4., which to me is the most worrying in the long term (a year +- 4 months, in my opinion, to reach what's in the picture), a possible breakthrough at Zolotyi Kolodyaz opens the opportunity you see down below. In white, fortified areas and large urban

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9/🧵 In fact, you have to remember that the Russians' first objective is not the hundreds of kilometers of fields in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, but the capture of the Donbas, which is constituted by the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. If the Luhansk Oblast is

10/🧵 If you remember, the Russians understood this problem extremely well since 2022, and tried to open the 3rd and 4th side in 2022, with Russian-controlled Lyman and Izyum being large logistical hubs that seriously threatened Slovyansk, but in September 2022 the Ukrainians

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11/🧵 As I always try to do in my threads, everything connects. This effort is also a combined effort not only towards Ukrainian bastions in the Donbas, but also to control one of Lyman's two only supply routes, seriously threatening the city in the long term, too.

12/🧵 Going back to Dobropillia, many people noticed a certain "hole" in the defenses in this area. As you can see, it is, very conveniently for the Russians, situated not only right on the tactical heights between the city and Zolotyi Kolodyaz, but a railway line also runs

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13/🧵 But for now, OPSEC remains tight, and neither side wants to disclose any information whatsoever, so the only thing we can do is wait. Please remember that the Zolotyi Kolodyaz breakthrough itself is a gray zone as of now. I use the word breakthrough because the Russian

14/🧵 In general, I think the Russians will make attempts to attack Dobropillia and Bilozerske from the east, if not to create a pincer from the northern side of these two cities, but if they will encounter resistence, they will have to stop, because taking on such a challenge

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15/🧵 In conclusion, dear viewers, please do not sugarcoat the situation. It is bad, very bad. This is one of the lowest places Ukraine has been since 2024 in terms of possible territorial loss and opportunities ceded to the Russians, after the Prohres catastrophe, which,

16/🧵 Thank you so much for reading this thread! I know, it was very boring and technical, but now you fully know the situation there and the risks that come from it. If you still enjoyed it, a simple repost will be very appreciated. This work takes huge amounts of efforts and

@Playfra0 Les Russes ont atteint le fameux trou dans la raquette dont vous parliez @clement_molin ?

@thopelep @clement_molin Very close. The gap is the one you see on the left, where there is no solid defensive line.

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@Playfra0 Bravo ! Un des meilleurs thread que j'ai vu, des faits, rien que des faits et du réalisme ! Les prochaines heures seront cruciales.

@docteurpepe Thank you so much, your words really support me!

@Playfra0 Very nice view of situation. Good work

@drazenhudak Thanks!

@Playfra0 C'est bien de commencer à m’écouter. Continus à évoquer tes sources, en l’occurrence deep state et creamy-caprice. Deuxièmement, comme je te l'avais dis, tu commences à comprendre que n’importe quelle ligne défensive sans infanterie ne sert quasiment à rien. Continu, bravo.

@MaximeFago89056 You might want to also go to your other pro-Russian friends and tell them to cite me as a source, too, as they have no problems in stealing my stuff very often. Why are you staying here?))

@Playfra0 This is very concerning 😬😔 Its like it here, the falling apart moment that RU-fu*ks have been talking about and hoping for.. I know that is not the thing going on here, but still it feels like a loss today..😔 I remember the days when we woke up to the good news..

@OveOveandreas Yes.. I remember when I followed the Kupyansk counteroffensive.. good times)

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