Origins of the NMH Requirement 2/25 The genesis of the NMH programme lies in the pressing need to streamline the UK’s fragmented helicopter fleet, which had become increasingly inefficient due to the sustainment burdens of operating multiple legacy types with partially

Leadership and Context 3/25 At the programme’s inception in late 2021, the Joint Helicopter Command was under the stewardship of AVM Nigel Colman, who held the position from 2020 to 2023. Colman, a seasoned RAF officer with a background in fast-jet operations and command roles,

The Flawed Foundation 4/25 From its very outset, the NMH programme was undermined by a cost-saving ethos that prioritised financial expediency over operational realism, creating a “one size fits all” framework ill-suited to the helicopters’ diverse demands. The MoD’s strategy

Role 1 - Medium-Lift Tactical Troop Transport 5/25 The first and arguably most demanding role NMH sought to fulfil is medium-lift tactical troop transport, epitomised by the Puma HC2’s capabilities. This platform, was operated primarily by the RAF’s 33 and 230 Sqn’s at RAF

Role 2 - Special Forces Support 6/25 Contrasting sharply with medium-lift duties, the Special Forces support role—currently handled by the Airbus AS365 Dauphin—demands a platform optimised for discretion and precision in high-risk covert missions. Operated by the Army’s 658

Role 3 - Light Utility in Brunei 7/25 The light utility role in Brunei, until recently performed by the Bell 212, represents a niche but vital function tailored to garrison support in a challenging tropical setting. Stationed with the British Forces Brunei, this single-engine

Role 4 - Light Utility in Cyprus 8/25 Similarly specialised is the light utility role in Cyprus, where the Bell 412 supports sovereignty operations in the British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. This twin-engine platform, accommodating up to 14 passengers,

Why These Roles Clash 9/25 The four roles—medium-lift transport, Special Forces support, Brunei light utility, and Cyprus sovereignty tasks—are fundamentally at odds in terms of scale, demands, and operational environments, making NMH’s unification attempt a recipe for

Cost-Driven Risks 10/25 NMH’s creation was overwhelmingly motivated by cost savings, with the MoD estimating £1-1.2 billion for acquiring and initially supporting up to 44 helicopters through fleet rationalisation, but this focus has paradoxically heightened risks across the

Initial Bidders - Leonardo’s AW149 11/25 The competition kicked off with four pre-qualified companies expressing interest, setting the stage for a high-stakes tender. Leonardo Helicopters led with the AW149, a twin-engine multi-role platform developed in the 2010s, boasting a

Airbus Helicopters’ H175M 12/25 Airbus entered the fray with the H175M, a militarised evolution of the civilian H175 super-medium helicopter, offering a 7,800 kg takeoff weight and seating for 16 passengers in a spacious cabin adaptable for troops, medevac, or cargo. Highlights

Lockheed Martin’s Black Hawk 13/25 Lockheed Martin countered with the S-70M Black Hawk, a battle-hardened icon with a 10,000 kg takeoff weight and capacity for 11-14 troops, backed by a staggering global fleet exceeding 5,000 units across 36 nations. Proven in conflicts from

AceHawk Aerospace’s ML-70 14/25 Rounding out the initial field was AceHawk Aerospace, a UK-based start-up proposing the ML-70, a refurbished and upgraded variant of the Sikorsky S-70 Black Hawk. This approach leveraged pre-owned airframes from surplus stocks, modernised with new

Challenges in Meeting Requirements 15/25 Each bidder asserted their platform’s ability to satisfy NMH’s expansive requirements through customisation, yet the roles’ diversity inherently strained feasibility, particularly for lighter missions. Modular designs—swappable kits for

Delays and Attrition 16/25 The NMH competition has been plagued by delays and bidder dropouts, eroding its competitive integrity from the start. The Invitation to Negotiate (ITN) was issued in February 2024, envisioning a swift award, but protracted evaluations—factoring

Scope Reductions 17/25 Faced with mounting delays, the MoD implemented scope reductions to salvage NMH, but these concessions reveal the programme’s foundational overambition. In 2023, the Cyprus and Brunei light utility roles were excised and awarded separately to Airbus for

Single-Source Scenario 18/25 By September 2024, NMH had devolved into a single-source negotiation with Leonardo’s AW149 as the lone survivor, stripping away competitive dynamics essential for value and innovation. This shift occurred without formal disqualifications, as rivals

Conflict of Interest Concerns 19/25 The single-source pivot has amplified conflict of interest concerns, particularly surrounding Leonardo’s UK Head, Nigel Colman, whose career arc ties directly to NMH’s origins. Appointed in March 2025, Colman previously commanded JHC from 2020

Undue Advantage? 20/25 Beyond optics, Colman’s dual roles raise substantive questions of undue advantage, potentially skewing NMH’s fairness even absent malice. His JHC tenure provided deep insights into operational pain points—like Puma’s hot-and-high limitations—that Leonardo

Parallels with AJAX 21/25 NMH’s trajectory mirrors the disastrous AJAX armoured vehicle programme, a £5.5 billion debacle awarded to General Dynamics in 2010 that exemplifies MoD’s recurring procurement ailments. AJAX, intended as a multi-role scout vehicle, suffered crippling

AW149 vs. Black Hawk 22/25 In the single-source spotlight, the AW149’s merits warrant scrutiny against withdrawn alternatives like the Black Hawk, revealing why the latter might better fit remaining needs. Leonardo’s AW149, modern with open architecture for upgrades and UK

Capability Gap 23/25 The Puma HC2’s March 2025 retirement has precipitated a severe capability gap, compelling the MoD to scramble for interim fixes while NMH lags. Without Puma’s medium-lift muscle, units like 16 Air Assault Brigade face reduced mobility, relying on heavier

Leadership Vacuum 24/25 Amid NMH’s turmoil, leadership gaps at the top exacerbate issues, with Andy Start serving as interim National Armaments Director (NAD) since April 2025. As DE&S CEO, Start has steered reforms like the NAD Group for integrated procurement, but his dual-hat

Conclusion - A(nother) MoD Shambles In summation, the NMH programme encapsulates MoD procurement dysfunction: a cost-obsessed multi-role consolidation that spawned delays, de-scoping, and a non-competitive single-source bind, leaving the AW149 as a contentious choice over the

@MtarfaL In early 2000s one of my ex-colleagues (AAC pilot) was seconded to DSTL. He contributed to Operational Analysis on UK rotary wing requirements. As normal is was completely ignored - he told me they concluded UK (non-SF) land forces only needed two a/c types; Chinook & Apache

@the_ex_engineer @PaulKennard18

@MtarfaL I do take issue with 22/25. How is any new piece equipment going to become combat proven if no one is willing to try it? The Armed Forces will almost always favour buying in American kit but a government has to consider sovereign industrial capabilities and use of public funds.

@GypsFulvusEsq If you have the funds to try out new equipment, great. The UK doesn’t, it only has itself to blame. The numbers we can afford are too small to make it viable unless you take the risk, like with Type 26, and pay for the concept and development.

@MtarfaL 1. I’m surprised Bell didn’t bid a late-model UH-1. 2. Probably the bigger lesson is that consideration should be given to joint programs.

@MtarfaL I appreciate the detailed thread and your criticism of MoD procurement seems well founded but I'm afraid I still don't understand why new Merlins can't do medium lift, new Wildcats do Brunei and Cyprus and a small commercial helicopter can't be modified for the SF role?