was the main obstacle in the way of peace. Thus Trump's accommodative tone with the Russians. This was not sufficient to create peace. So Trump is now pivoting towards a very different strategy for forcing an end to the war. But the end is the same.

fwiw I predicted this would happen back in January. Was clear to me then that the admin's foreign policy was going to be focused in the first year on resolving three big problems: Russia, Iran, trade.

They were going to try to resolve the first by being very nice to Russia; the second by being very harsh with Iran; the third by upending the global trade order. China would not be the focus until these three things were resolved.

My concern, as I expressed it then, was that this plan might not work: being nice to Russia did not seem to me likely to end the war, and I doubted that being harsh on Iran would solve that problem either. In this case China issues would continually be deferred to the future.

Well, it turns out I was wrong on Iran--I was on the "let's not intervene in any way" side. From the vantage point of Sept 2025 it looks like the president and his team were right on that question, and I was wrong.

On the Russia question though... I think I have mostly proven correct. Every administration does this. Every administration since Clinton comes in determined to reset US-Russian relations, to clear away old legacies and bad blood. Clinton, Bush, Obama, Trump I, even Biden.

It is the swampiest of all swampy ideas, resetting relations with the Russians. It never works.

(Related problem: seeing Russian relations with Eastern Europe as a function of American policy instead of something that has its own dynamic--a dynamic that we can influence but do not really control).

Anyways, I suspected from the beginning we would end up here. This administration would, like every administration, try to reset relations with the Russians. This would not compel the Russians to leave the battlefield. Sooner or later we would realize this basic reality.

Once this reality sunk in we would take a harder a line. Because Trump wants to end the war. His attitude is not, and has never been, "let the Europeans war among themselves, it doesn't matter." He wants to end it.

https://x.com/johnwgunnison/st... No that is not true really. Your position can be--and the isolationists in Trumpworld argue this explicitly all the time--"it does not matter if the war ends or does not end, that is their problem, not ours."

But I can be more explicit here then: Trump's position is, and has been, that this war needs to end *soon.* He wants this not to be a problem on America's plate. He prefers a quick resolution on less favorable terms than a slow resolution on more favorable terms to NATO.

Trump still believes that. The difference between Trump now and Trump in January 2025 is that Trump in January 2025 did not think the Russians needed additional incentives to come to the peace table. The Russians did not act as he expected. Now he thinks differently.

If you think of Trump's position as "I will say and do whatever is necessary to end this war in 2025 short of repeating Biden's Kabul airlift experience" then you see a certain coherence to his actions. That goal hasn't changed--assumptions about Russian behavior have.

@Scholars_Stage The strategy has been the same from the start.

@Scholars_Stage Everyone’s position is that they want the war to end. This is like saying, “his position that the economy should grow.” The *how* is the entire substance

@Scholars_Stage This tweet is something like what he should have said on day 1 if his goal was to get both sides to the negotiating table. Instead he behaved one would if the goal was only to end American involvement with a fig leaf of plausible deniability. What's changed?

@Scholars_Stage A coherent analysis - but ultimately a rationalization of Trump's overestimation of American power: the US simply doesn't have the leverage over either Russia or Ukraine to force a significantly hasten the end to the war.

@Scholars_Stage Do wonder if he smelled weakness in Putin & is setting up to exploit it.

@Scholars_Stage Trump does not care AT ALL about the war ...none of it. He IDs issues he thinks he can "win" and will make him look good. Saw same with KJU and denuclearization. He picks the hardest ones bc he overestimates his ability to "win." Failing? No worries, just reframe, move on

@Scholars_Stage He has changed his views on whether Ukraine can win and also whether Putin likes him enough to stop the war.

@Scholars_Stage Some in his admin have a for pol vision or approach...They are constantly pushing each other back and forth, and Administration policy reflects this. But he is only about himself, he has no ideological underpinning. So his policy is what he says TODAY

@Scholars_Stage I think that's far too generous to someone that's never expressed a complicated thought. I'd argue instead a) someone finally got through to him that he looks weak b) the Russians really are weak, which makes that worse, and c) he'll flip a dozen more times at least

@Scholars_Stage Yup. I think part of Trump’s problem before was his cold war conditioning. He seems to be over it now, only recognizing Russia as an opponent because they 1) still have nukes 2) have set themselves up as an opponent 3) oil. Their conventional military might is irrelevant.

@Scholars_Stage Liberal armchair experts will also exclaim it was always known it wouldn't work. However, instead of acknowledging that with the pivot it should prove Trump was never "in bed with Putin", they'll just say "this is further proof of Trump's incompetence!"

@Scholars_Stage I don't see how a shitty end of the war is better for the US than an ongoing war.