1/ 'HELL NO WE WON'T GO', part 3: why many Russians don't want to go to war any more. ⬇️
2/ After Russian warblogger Alex Kartavykh asked his followers on Telegram why "you're ... still fixing a stove in civilian life ... and you're still not storming Pokrovsk", he received no fewer than 4,396 responses. This thread continues a look at what they said.
3/ The first thread in this series summarises what respondents gave as their reasons for not volunteering to go to war: https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/stat...
4/ The second part highlights representative examples collated by Kartavykh into a number of categories. https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/stat...
5/ In this third instalment, Kartavykh analyses the themes and trends behind the comments, and draws a number of conclusions:
6/ "1️⃣ Money doesn't compensate for mistrust and [mis]management risks. The core barrier isn't "civilian greed," but the weak reputation of the "employer": the feeling that "they'll cheat you, send you on an assault, and then never let you go."
7/ "Until this is corrected, the increase in payments will only lead to a drip-drip funnel.
8/ "2️⃣ Demand a contract with clear boundaries. We need a fixed term, mandatory rotations/replacements, guaranteed vacations and treatment/evacuation; training should be until actual combat readiness, not [for only] "2-3 weeks."
9/ "3️⃣ Operational modernisation is more important than PR. Communications, UAVs, medical care, and building materials should be provided by the state, not "chip in and buy yourself a radio." These are the conditions for minimal rational consent.
10/ "4️⃣ Clear goals and accurate personnel signals are required. Society needs an articulation of the ultimate goal/image of victory. Punishing "high performers" and promoting "failures" demoralizes potential contract soldiers.
11/ "5️⃣ Family and the home front are a recurring theme. Until people are confident in the safety and security of their loved ones, they are not willing to "trade their lives for money." A policy of support for the home front and the families of mobilised [people] is needed.
12/ "6️⃣ There is a loyalist core, but it also "calculates." Even among those "for," training, supplies, and deadlines are a prerequisite. This is not pure ideology, but pragmatic loyalty.
13/ "Key themes and trends: 1️⃣ Systemic crisis of trust.
14/ "Almost all [respondents] attribute the reasons for refusal to zero trust in the state/MOD/"authorities": people don't believe the promises, don't understand the goals of the Special Military Operation, and see a gap between the official picture and reality.
15/ "2️⃣ "Deception as a recruitment policy" and [service in] perpetuity. The contract is advertised as annual, but in fact, it's "until the end of the Special Military Operation."
16/ "They promise specialised military service, but in practice, "everyone is sent to assault," training lasts 14-21 days and is often interrupted.
17/ "3️⃣ Unacceptable conditions of employment: "assault is expendable." "The average assault life expectancy is 12 days," the lack of sustainable superiority in the "lower sky," weak counter-drone defence, and errors due to false reporting are the key to refusal.
18/ "4️⃣ Financial motivation does not work without an idea and fairness. "Life is more valuable," and without meaning and "common sacrifice," money does not convert into contracts. Money ≠ motivation to die.
19/ "5️⃣ Public markers of mistrust: the "Puzik" case [a commander who sent two UAV operators to their deaths as a punishment for reporting his drug dealing]. The lack of a fair resolution to high-profile episodes explains the failure of recruitment in the eyes of some audiences.
20/ "6️⃣ A gap between the elite and the "deep people." The authorities are not listening to the "grassroots"; there is a demand for direct conversation and a "shared burden."
21/ "[Respondents] propose direct conversation with citizens and a "shared burden" (participation of the children of the elite / leading by example).
22/ "7️⃣ Minority/hardline positions. A line is being set for forced mobilisation and the recognition of the limits of volunteerism for the infantry. This is a minority, but it is noted as an alternative to the "money" model of recruitment." /end Source: https://t.me/AlexCarrier/13362
Part 4 is here: https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/stat...
@ChrisO_wiki Once we start seeing mass mobilisation... It's over for Putin
@ChrisO_wiki Doesn’t sound like mobilisation is far off if this is the general attitude
@ChrisO_wiki @threadreaderapp unroll, please Thread Reader
@ChrisO_wiki From WWII: "The Wehrbauer was envisioned as both a soldier and a farmer. After a victorious war, these individuals, often veterans from the SS and other front-line units, would be given a fully-equipped farm in the conquered Eastern territories". Soldiers of fortune. Then & Now
@ChrisO_wiki In main image, the famous russian tank, with the ammunition in a circle under the turret. The only tank that can send its turret into space
@ChrisO_wiki again, absolutely zero concern about killing people for money. russian population is a big PMC, with related primitive society
@ChrisO_wiki So, the quick summary: To attract new recruits, russia would need to become a civilized state. Which wouldn't be invading its neighbours, so this flow of fresh meat wouldn't be needed.
@ChrisO_wiki In short - russians could go to war for money if russia is not russia. As this won't happen at least in our lifetime then forced draft is the only mass option remaining for Putin. https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/stat...
@ChrisO_wiki Meanwhile Ukraine TCC kidnapping people daily. You know it but you won't admitted it either, that's getting worst than what you made today