
Tactx
@Tactx_
Ange Postecoglou Tactics - Brave or Naive? A thread on the London Derby as Chelsea beat Spurs.
When the Chelsea line-up was announced, it was apparent that Caicedo would play right-back when not in possession and defensive midfield when in possession, creating a double pivot with Lavia. There is nothing new here. In front of the double pivot, Palmer and Fernandez created the 'box' midfield.
Spurs set up in a 4-3-3 with two advanced midfield players. Bissouma played a deeper role, which saw him assigned to Palmer. With 1:31 on the clock, we see the problems that will arise throughout the game. Chelsea outnumbers the Spurs in central areas. With Bissouma instructed to stay close to Palmer, Fernandez is in space to receive and face the Spurs' goal.
This leads to a through pass to Jackson in a dangerous area.
The Spurs' plan created good transition situations. Cucurealla's slip led to the first goal, but the press was good. Caicedo has been unable to make the double pivot as he has taken the throw on the right-hand side. This allows Kulusevski to shadow mark Fernandez, and there is no overload in midfield.
Spurs continued on the front foot, but when Caicedo could make up the double pivot, the Chelsea play was too slick through the centre of the pitch. One-touch passing didn't allow the Spurs players to get pressure on the ball. Here, Colwill finds Fernandez as Bissouma shifts to mark Palmer.
Postecoglou argued after the game that this pressing style was good enough to take a 2-0 lead, so why change it? That's a fair point, considering the high press forced another Cucurella slip, which led to the 2nd goal. Without the slip, though, Fernandez is positioned to break the midfield line once again.
Spurs will have prepared for the 'box' midfield of Chelsea. If Bissouma was to mark Palmer, who would mark Fernandez? Below, we can see Romero stepping out from his centre-back position.
Romero has too much distance to cover to get adequate pressure. Fernandez runs off the back of Romero, and Chelsea have a dangerous attacking position. The Spurs back four is all over the place with the two centre-backs on the same vertical line.
Dragusin had replaced Romero at RCB at this point. Jackson moved to pin the right-centre-back, and now Spurs don't have a contingency plan for Fernandez to find a position to break the midfield line. Bissouma continues to stay close to Palmer.
The pattern leads to the Sancho goal. Quotes from Sancho after the game. 'They’re very aggressive and we knew we would catch them if we broke the lines and beat their press. “The gaffer always told us in training to stay wide, especially the wingers to create the one-vs-ones, you know the overlaps for two-vs-ones.' Fernandez is free between the lines, with Bissouma marking Palmer and Jackson pinning Dragusin, which prevents him from jumping.
Sancho has a one-on-one with Porro, and Fernandez underlaps. With Dragusin following the underlap and Bissouma unable to affect play due to marking Palmer, Sancho can drive inside and finish.
For the rest of the first half, Chelsea created numerous scenarios with Fernandez unmarked between the lines. Palmer played a quiet role in the first half, but his positional play helped his team. Jackson occupies Dragusin again. Spurs have no solution. The two scenarios below are 15 seconds apart.
When Jackson couldn't pin Dragusin, the Spurs centre-back was ready to jump onto Fernandez. Jackson exploited the space left behind, and Fernandez was quick to support.
The insistence on stopping Palmer led to Spurs overloading their left-hand side. Neto doesn't cross the ball here, but the danger on the weaker side is apparent and remains a threat throughout the game.
Below, the second half with Palmer in wide positions. Notice the Spurs overload on the left, leaving opportunities to cross with space in central positions.
Palmer's influence started to grow as Bissouma's concentration waned. The quick transition forced Bissouma out of position. Sarr covered Palmer, but Lavia and Palmer's understanding broke the midfield line.
Bissouma decides to jump onto the double pivot in this instance. This leaves Palmer in the space behind, and Spurs are not compact between the units. Lavia, who was excellent in the first half, finds Palmer with a one-touch pass. Chelsea's one-touch passing to break lines is a big feature of their game and central progression.
You had to feel for Bissouma as he was completely overrun. As soon as he shifted to close a half-space, Chelsea found the other on the opposite side.
Spurs fans' biggest concern was that more was needed to rectify this at half-time. With Lavia carrying a knock, Fernandez dropped to a deeper position alongside Caicedo. Cucurella would now invert from left back and often found himself as the free man. Porro came narrow to close the space available to Cucurella.
The ball is shifted wide to Sancho, and Cucurella quickly moves in behind the space that Porro has now left. This move leads to a big chance two minutes into the second half.
Spurs offered no solution to the performance problem the four Chelsea central players created, and Chelsea carved them open at will. The scenarios from the first half continued into the second half.
Postecoglou must accept that his team can't go toe-to toe in these tactical battles. The top teams concede control to Chelsea within the game. The formation and structure are difficult to press consistently, and Chelsea will find holes in any team that does not match their midfield four.
So, how have the top teams (and tacticians) played against the overload in midfield? Arsenal used Partey to man-mark Palmer, forcing play to the Chelsea left and dropping Martinelli on the opposite side.
Liverpool dropped Jones deeper onto Palmer and Gravenberch onto Gusto while looking to cut off central passing lanes to the double pivot. Caicedo assisted a goal in this game, but Liverpool restricted Chelsea from breaking their midfield line.