Tactx

Amorim’s 3-4-3 was tested last night against a well-coached Newcastle side that dismantled the structure in the first 30 minutes of the game.

Tactical thread 🧵(Rated 18 for Man United fans)

Animations of the systems and the related performance problems. 

Amorim is a manager who wants his team to play on the front foot. We highlighted this during our analysis of Sporting Lisbon, which you find at the link below.

https://tactxcoach.com/programs/ruben-amorim-out-of-possession-tactics

You can see this in the initial moments, and this is what we have come to expect from Amorim’s front players. Amad and Zirkzee join Hojlund to press high. Eriksen and Casemiro back them up.

The problem is that half the team is on the front foot. The other half is pinned. The wing-backs don’t jump. Both Newcastle full-backs are free.

Again, there was aggressive pressing from the front players one minute in. 

Martinez is late to press Joelinton, and Newcastle takes the first line of the press out of the game. 

Newcastle’s out-of-possession roles looked well-defined tactically. 

Staying compact to force the ball into De Ligt or Martinez and then jumping to a man-to-man press 

Hall would jump from left back onto Mazraoui. Murphy would track Dalot on the other side. 

This gave Burn and Trippier responsibility for marking Amad and Zirkzee. 

An example of Gordon protecting the central space to force the pass into De Ligt. 

Note that Hall is ready to jump. 

And on the opposite side, Guimaraes jumps onto Martinez. 

Isak is responsible for Maguire while pressing the goalkeeper. Isak does this incredibly well and at a high intensity. 

Back to Man United. 

Casemiro and Eriksen are looking to play on the front foot, which left them with a problem. Outnumbered in midfield, Newcastle developed a free player between the lines. 

With no Man United centre-back stepping out, who marks Joelinton? 

This gave Newcastle complete control, which led to the first goal. 

All the Man United players highlighted were caught between marking two players and couldn’t exert any pressure on the ball. 

With five players on the defensive line and the three centre-backs unwilling to step out, Eriksen and Casemiro are outnumbered 2v5. 

Newcastle got into the final third and scored the first goal. 

Amad and Diallo offer no support to the structure, but their initial role is to press high and aggressively.

If Zirkzee did press high, it was simple to play around as the Man United wing-backs remained pinned. 

Amorim’s wing-backs on the ball side are normally aggressive; we didn’t see this last night. 

Newcastle then easily manipulated the press of Man United. 

As Martinez tracks Guimaraes, Isak moves into the space to receive and turn towards the goal. Four United players are taken out of the game with one pass. 

And so Man United are stuck between a rock and a hard place.
Press high and aggressively and Newcastle plays around them, as the wing-backs don’t jump on the ball side once again. 

The alternative is to allow Newcastle time on the ball in deeper positions. 

With Casemiro and Eriksen deeper, it’s working against Amorim’s front-footed principles. His centre-backs are 3v1. 

This is where the confusion lies. 

The Man United players are unsure whether to go on the front foot or protect the space. 

Eriksen goes on the front foot while Casemiro protects. Martinez is late to jump on Guimaraes can receive and play forward. 

The second goal build-up comes from this confusion. Outnumbered in midfield, Eriksen presses, Casemiro protects and the centre-backs remain in a 3v1.

Amorim’s ideal scenario here. De Ligt jumps to Joelinton, Casemiro jumps. 

Amorim teams have been set up to be on the front foot with aggressive pressing from all units. The system falls apart when one player fails to carry out the role.

The dysfunction last night was caused by a front five playing Amorim’s front-footed pressing style but with a back five who, against Howe’s tactics, were reluctant to jump from their unit.

The players are far from the ideal personnel for this 3-4-3 system. As Amorim said, he won’t change the system. To stand any chance of results, he needs to coach his units to work as one, but even then, as Eddie Howe shows, this is a system that any tactically astute manager can exploit.

I'll cover this in more detail tomorrow with, hopefully, a tactical camera view. (Need it for second half for full picture of Chelsea man-to-man press)

Chelsea set out in a mid 4-4-2 block.

Man City dropped Kovacic low and pushed the full-backs high (creating a 3v2) 

This allowed City to build with ease. 

Rather than using the width, they played into Chelsea's block. 

In this instance, Akanji, with time on the ball, plays into the traffic. Chelsea win it and break. 

The problem with a midfielder dropping onto the defensive line (Kovacic) is they don't defend transitions like a defender.

The 3v2 is gone.

Chelsea should have scored their second. 

Man City soon realised they needed to play around the block rather than through it.

Chelsea, for all the attacking talent, have poor pressing players in wide areas. 

The shifts to playing around forced the Chelsea wingers back onto the defensive line. Particularly on the right with Madueke. 

This led to him playing Marmoush onside for the goal, which was then compounded as Gvardiol followed up to score.

The concern for me is the defender's body position the ball over the is signalled. 

Maresca knew he had lost control and reverted to a man-to-man press from the hour mark.

Man City played over it and opened Chelsea up. This is 1 minute before the Haaland goal.

I'll cover this tomorrow with better camera angles. 

It was the same scenario one minute later as Chelsea pushed on aggressively. 

One direct ball and Haaland scores.



A full article will be posted tomorrow for subscribers to our website!

I love watching Spurs, and as Ange said, 'Are you not entertained?'

But surely, there has to be a tactical tweak to prevent the same pattern occurring, especially at 3-1/3-2.

Porro jumps to Dalot (LWB) and leaves a huge hole behind him for Garnacho (left forward) to exploit. 

Without any tactical shift in players positioning, the players are asked to cover huge distances to find their mark. 

Porro to Dalot/ Sarr to Garnacho.

We have seen the centre-backs take responsibility for the position Garnacho takes, leading to an unstable structure. 

And I would guess it's related to the injuries that are occurring at centre-back, with muscle injuries to Romero, Van de Van and Davies.

Sarr takes the strain of the long distances in the second half as Porro jumps. 

This is where the entertainment comes from. The high-risk, high-reward pressing is a joy to watch. But can it take Spurs to the next level?

Arne Slot gives a lot away in his interviews. Manipulating his shape to create larger distances for the opponent to cover = more time on the ball.

Expecting Arsenal to shift to the 3-Diamond-3 against Crystal Palace when in possession. 

Here are some tactical points to look for. 

Timber can play a huge part by commiting the Palace left forward. If he doesn't, the Palace structure remains strong.   

However, it does increase the risk of the transition. 

How I expect it to look in possession for Arsenal.

Palace wants to keep their wingers high for any transition. 

Arsenal's press against Spurs last night was excellent

Well drilled and with intensity, they continuously locked Spurs into their left-hand side and won the ball back or created dangerous situations.

Concern for Spurs? They didn't adjust their build-up to counter it.

THREAD🧵 

Arsenal adopted a man-to-man press with Timber leaving his right-back position (and +1 on the defensive line) to jump onto Spence at left-back.

The roles within this press are defined in the image below. 

Havertz would always try to force play to the Arsenal right with pressure on the goalkeeper marking Dragusin.

Odegaard, Rice and Partey locked onto the Spurs midfield players to prevent any link passes the player Havertz had left (Dragusin) 

You can see here the risk involved to find the spare player. 

Arsenal have Spurs where they want them. 

With this man-to-man press, you can see what Arsenal's defensive line looks like.

3v3, Spurs didn't manipulate this possible advantage. The longer pass into Kulusevski could have been a strong option. 

Spurs want to find the spare player in the build-up, but Arsenal are prepared for this. Odegaard marks in fornt of Bissouma in this example.

This will force play into the LCB (Gray) and make play predictable for Arsenal. 

The only joy Spurs had with the link pass to find the spare player was when Partey didn't go tight enough from his deeper position. 

The same again, Maddison drops deeper to link play and Spurs can build from the back. 

Arsenal generally got the press right. 

It was a slight shift away from Odegaard leading the press on the front line but he was still dictating with his tactical understanding. 

Here he's telling Sterling to get ready to go onto Gray. 

We lost count of the number of times Arsenal locked Spurs into the Arsenal right hand-side. 

Forcing play into this position, they turned the ball over and ensured Spurs could not build any progressive attacks. 

The concern for Spurs in this. At no point did they adjust.

We want to highlight Brighton. Arsenal tried to lock Brighton into one side and it looked to be working.

A slightly different pressing strategy but looking for the same outcome. 

Within 5 minutes, Brighton adjusted. Dropping a CM into  the defensive line prevented them from being locked into one side. 

Arteta adjusted to a full man-to-man press but Brighton simply went over it. 

Two managers constantly looking to give their team the edge. 

This was the most disappointing part of Spur's game last night. At no time did they adjust, and they kept playing into the Arsenal trap. 

Arteta would have been asking for more of the same for the whole game.

The solutions?

Spurs had joy with wide rotations. It's a usual pattern of their play, but they stopped doing it after Arsenal caught them out. Without it, they became predictable.

Pushing Spence higher and rotating asks more questions about the Timber role. 

Another possible solution is the positioning of Gray (move more central) and Spence (drop lower). Pushing the midfield higher would enable the back three to then divide the press of Sterling and Havertz and create a 4v2 with the goalkeeper

This creates a larger distance for Timber to cover. If he jumps early, the longer pass into the equal numbers on the frontline has to be the option.

Mo Salah is creating unbelievable numbers this season.

So what's the difference? How is Arne Slot getting the best out of him?

He's performing a role that Hazard, Messi, Ronaldo and Mbappe have performed in the past—limited defensive responsibility. 

A quick thread 🧵 

While it's fair to say Salah has never been the most defensive minded of forward players, he's always picked up positions to support the defensive structure (image below v Everton last season). 

This season, he often takes up the HIGHEST position when the opposition has the ball, and his thought process is simple.

Find space as close to the opponent's goal as possible

Today against West Ham.

He has no thought of tracking Wan Bissaka. He backs his team-mates to win the ball and find him. 

Within 4 seconds of the above image, Liverpool have Salah on the ball, in the box, and it leads to the third goal. 

And you will see it repeatedly from the beginning of the season. The Liverpool midfield will do his running to ensure he can keep his dangerous transition position.

And when he produces the numbers he is, the midfield won't complain. 

The lack of structure will cause problems for Liverpool. Robinson of Fulham highlighted this in the recent draw as he repeatedly ran off the back of Salah. 

But it's a risk Slot is willing to take. Salah must produce at the other end of the pitch to justify this defensive weakness. 

The REWARDS far outweigh the risk. Even as Liverpool press with two central players. Salah sees space and edges towards the Spurs goal. 

And while the opponent thinks they have secure possession. Salah reads and understands Liverpool's biggest strength, the counter-press. 

This consistently puts him up against opponent centre-backs rather than full-backs 

And once in that position down the side of the centre-backs, his finishing is lethal.

While also adding assists for those attacking the back post. 

Ange Postecoglou Tactics - Brave or Naive?

A thread on the London Derby as Chelsea beat Spurs. 

When the Chelsea line-up was announced, it was apparent that Caicedo would play right-back when not in possession and defensive midfield when in possession, creating a double pivot with Lavia. 

There is nothing new here. In front of the double pivot, Palmer and Fernandez created the 'box' midfield.

Spurs set up in a 4-3-3 with two advanced midfield players. Bissouma played a deeper role, which saw him assigned to Palmer.

With 1:31 on the clock, we see the problems that will arise throughout the game. Chelsea outnumbers the Spurs in central areas. With Bissouma instructed to stay close to Palmer, Fernandez is in space to receive and face the Spurs' goal.

This leads to a through pass to Jackson in a dangerous area. 

The Spurs' plan created good transition situations. Cucurealla's slip led to the first goal, but the press was good. 

Caicedo has been unable to make the double pivot as he has taken the throw on the right-hand side. This allows Kulusevski to shadow mark Fernandez, and there is no overload in midfield.

Spurs continued on the front foot, but when Caicedo could make up the double pivot, the Chelsea play was too slick through the centre of the pitch. One-touch passing didn't allow the Spurs players to get pressure on the ball. 

Here, Colwill finds Fernandez as Bissouma shifts to mark Palmer.

Postecoglou argued after the game that this pressing style was good enough to take a 2-0 lead, so why change it? 

That's a fair point, considering the high press forced another Cucurella slip, which led to the 2nd goal. Without the slip, though, Fernandez is positioned to break the midfield line once again.

Spurs will have prepared for the 'box' midfield of Chelsea. If Bissouma was to mark Palmer, who would mark Fernandez? 

Below, we can see Romero stepping out from his centre-back position. 

Romero has too much distance to cover to get adequate pressure. Fernandez runs off the back of Romero, and Chelsea have a dangerous attacking position. 

The Spurs back four is all over the place with the two centre-backs on the same vertical line. 

Dragusin had replaced Romero at RCB at this point. Jackson moved to pin the right-centre-back, and now Spurs don't have a contingency plan for Fernandez to find a position to break the midfield line. 

Bissouma continues to stay close to Palmer. 

The pattern leads to the Sancho goal. Quotes from Sancho after the game.

'They’re very aggressive and we knew we would catch them if we broke the lines and beat their press.

“The gaffer always told us in training to stay wide, especially the wingers to create the one-vs-ones, you know the overlaps for two-vs-ones.'

Fernandez is free between the lines, with Bissouma marking Palmer and Jackson pinning Dragusin, which prevents him from jumping.

Sancho has a one-on-one with Porro, and Fernandez underlaps. With Dragusin following the underlap and Bissouma unable to affect play due to marking Palmer, Sancho can drive inside and finish. 

For the rest of the first half, Chelsea created numerous scenarios with Fernandez unmarked between the lines. 

Palmer played a quiet role in the first half, but his positional play helped his team. 

Jackson occupies Dragusin again. Spurs have no solution. The two scenarios below are 15 seconds apart.

When Jackson couldn't pin Dragusin, the Spurs centre-back was ready to jump onto Fernandez. Jackson exploited the space left behind, and Fernandez was quick to support. 

The insistence on stopping Palmer led to Spurs overloading their left-hand side. Neto doesn't cross the ball here, but the danger on the weaker side is apparent and remains a threat throughout the game. 

Below, the second half with Palmer in wide positions. Notice the Spurs overload on the left, leaving opportunities to cross with space in central positions. 

Palmer's influence started to grow as Bissouma's concentration waned. 

The quick transition forced Bissouma out of position. Sarr covered Palmer, but Lavia and Palmer's understanding broke the midfield line. 

Bissouma decides to jump onto the double pivot in this instance. This leaves Palmer in the space behind, and Spurs are not compact between the units. Lavia, who was excellent in the first half, finds Palmer with a one-touch pass. 

Chelsea's one-touch passing to break lines is a big feature of their game and central progression.

You had to feel for Bissouma as he was completely overrun. As soon as he shifted to close a half-space, Chelsea found the other on the opposite side. 

Spurs fans' biggest concern was that more was needed to rectify this at half-time. With Lavia carrying a knock, Fernandez dropped to a deeper position alongside Caicedo. 

Cucurella would now invert from left back and often found himself as the free man. Porro came narrow to close the space available to Cucurella.

The ball is shifted wide to Sancho, and Cucurella quickly moves in behind the space that Porro has now left. This move leads to a big chance two minutes into the second half. 

Spurs offered no solution to the performance problem the four Chelsea central players created, and Chelsea carved them open at will. The scenarios from the first half continued into the second half. 

Postecoglou must accept that his team can't go toe-to toe in these tactical battles. 

The top teams concede control to Chelsea within the game. 

The formation and structure are difficult to press consistently, and Chelsea will find holes in any team that does not match their midfield four.

So, how have the top teams (and tacticians) played against the overload in midfield? 

Arsenal used Partey to man-mark Palmer, forcing play to the Chelsea left and dropping Martinelli on the opposite side. 

Liverpool dropped Jones deeper onto Palmer and Gravenberch onto Gusto while looking to cut off central passing lanes to the double pivot.

Caicedo assisted a goal in this game, but Liverpool restricted Chelsea from breaking their midfield line. 

Yesterday, there was a sequence of play (Foden hitting the post) in which play became a 5v5 after Madueke and Jackson took themselves out of defensive responsibilities.

It's ten minutes into the game. 

Play develops, and a few seconds later, the 5v5 is apparent.

It looks like a training drill. 

The crazy part is 14 seconds later from the first image.

There's still no attacking player of Chelsea in sight. 

For all their attacking talent, Palmer, Madueke, Sancho, and Fernandez need to find a defensive intelligence. 

For all of the in-possession criticism of Russel Martin and Southampton, his out-of-possession tactics ultimately led to the result before his sacking.

Let's take a deeper look at Southampton's OOP tactics.

THREAD🧵 

Southampton lined up with a 4-4-2 diamond. 

With split strikers, Southampton looked to press high. 

From the 1st minute, we see a problem.

Sulemana closes Forster down; the goalkeeper makes a simple link pass to get his centre back on the ball. Line one of the press is broke. 

Spurs now have 4v3 on the midfield line with the familiar site of their full-backs inverting.

Sarr rotates with Spence and they combine as Maddison makes his move untracked off the back of the midfield line. 

Both centre-backs are drawn to Solanke. 

With the midfield overload, Maddison has become the free man, and neither the midfield nor the defensive unit takes responsibility for him. This leads to the first goal after 40 seconds. 

Armstrong and Sulemena have dual roles. 

At times, they were the highest-pressing players but also responsible for tracking the Spurs' full-backs. 

There's a simple out ball for the Spurs as the full-backs hold their wide position. 

And with little pressure on the ball, the outnumbered Southampton midfield looked to cover the ball side.

Armstrong divides the opposite side centre back, and left back. The distance is too large to cover. 

Despite their attempts, Dibling, Sulemena and Armstrong offered nothing in terms of pressing high. 

With the large distances to cover, Spurs could pick them off and build their attacks with these three players out of the game. 

Goal number two

Spence and Maddison rotate and have a 2v1. Downes can't get out to support. They play the ball around Fernandes for Maddison to cross and Son to score.

Note the positions of Dibling, Armstrong and Sulemena. This will leave their defence exposed to an overload. 

Martin brought Sulemena off after fifteen minutes and went to a 5-3-2. Dibling playing just behind Armstrong.

A full week of training has now been wasted as they move to damage limitation at 3-0.

Dibling joins Armstrong on the first line of the press in this 5-3-2 and is ready to jump onto Gray at left centre-back for Spurs. 

There is never any real pressure on the ball on the opposite side of the pitch, and Spurs find the switch again to stretch the three man Saints midfield.

The new formation leaves the wing-backs isolated in possession. Southampton compensates for this by providing support beyond the Spurs' defensive line. 

This leaves them wide open for the counter-attack. 

Udogie steals the ball and Southampton are outnumbered.

Sarr, who we have highlighted, continues his run to score the fourth goal. 

The Southampton midfield three are highlighted here on this Spurs transition leading to the fourth goal... 

Dibling seemed to have a free role out of possession. In this position, you would think he would mark the deep-lying midfielder of Spurs, but he didn't. 

He picked up positions where he could hurt Spurs on the transition.

Southampton can't afford this luxury. 

From there, it was difficult to tell Southampton's pressing style. 

While they didn't sit off in a low block, they never got any pressure on the ball and left huge distances to cover in wide areas.

It was apparent this system had not been worked on. 

And the fifth and final goal came from this set-up.

Again, there is no real pressure on the ball, but Southhampton continue to press without any real intensity. The two forwards and three midfielders are connected but are not backed up by any defenders.

It's an 8v5 including the goalkeeper.

Spurs switch the play slowly, and Southampton don't shift across the pitch with any real pace.

Downes, the central player of the three midfield players is somehow taken out of the game. 

The Southampton midfield three positions. 

Based on these positions, it's hard to believe the ball is on the left touchline. 

Allowing an unmarked Maddison to move in behind the defensive line again to score his second of the game. 

Pep conceded some control to Southampton yesterday as he looked to stop the link passes to the Southampton forward players.

Southampton created opportunities through 
- overloading wide areas
- dragging City centre backs out to wide areas
- linking with striker 

The City press usually forces opponents into wide areas where City press aggressively.

Southampton emptied the middle of the pitch to create overloads in wide areas. 

With Akanji, Dias and Kovacic marking aggressively, Southampton linked to find the space in behind. 

The central trio of Akanji, Dias and Kovacic were being dragged out of the central area as there was no one to mark in the centre of the pitch. 

It's rare to see so many players in wide channels during the build-up. 

Southampton found a way to progress and then link with their striker. City, again, tried to press in wide areas but left themselves exposed in doing so. 

Pep changed it, going with a less aggressive press while maintaining a central triangle of his CBs with Kovacic. 

It gave City less control but more security. 

Kovacic was more reserved. 

Securing the centre instead being dragged higher and wider. 

This led to Southampton's control as they built with overloads. 

Pep's trade-off was that Southampton linked with their striker less. 