Islam Bouafif 🇹🇳🇵🇸

1/Lineup Despite a draw being enough to secure second place and qualify, Flick didn’t opt for full rotation. He understood that if we won and Liverpool lost, we could finish first, which would mean more prize money. On the other hand, a loss could drop us to fourth,

Not only reducing revenue but also increasing the chances of facing tougher opponents in future knockout rounds. Because of this, Flick kept rotation minimal, only resting Cubarsí and Casado in favor of De Jong and Eric García.

Judging by how the game unfolded, I think Flick, like me, didn’t expect Atalanta to press like this, he probably thought they will sit deep and rely on counters. If he had anticipated their press I believe he would have preferred starting Casado and especially Fermín, and Ferran.

Fermín and Ferran are better at making runs and exploiting high defensive lines than Lewy and Gavi, while In Frenkie’s case, sacrificing Casado’s defensive security for him, only makes sense when facing a low block, where Frenkie's ability to break lines is more valuable.

Another possible explanation is that, regardless of Atalanta’s pressing approach, Flick simply wanted more control and possession instead of our usual high-risk, direct football—to at least secure the draw we needed, which is something players like Gavi and FDJ can provide better

2/First half Atalanta tried to press high, which is risky, given that almost every team that has attempted to press us with a high defensive line has either conceded multiple goals or at least given up several big chances. But Atalanta executed it better than any team we’ve faced

First they tried to close our best side in buildup our left side, they never left Balde any space, and they always kept him and Pedri in a 2v3, and even though Pedri usually can still get out with the ball even with numerical disadvantage, today, he was simply not on his best day

Their main strategy was a strict man-to-man press: De Ketelaere on Araujo, Retegui on García, Pašalić on De Jong, De Roon on Pedri, and Éderson on Gavi. Their wingbacks pressed our fullbacks when the ball went wide, while their back three tracked our front three

Normally, Barça can break this type of press through positional rotations, to confuse markers. However, Atalanta’s defenders were highly disciplined, as you can see even with FDJ and Pedri switching positions, and Gavi leaning more to the left, the same markers are still on them.

Even when Frenkie dropped deep between the center-backs to create our usual 3v2 numerical advantage in buildup, Pašalić stuck with him, keeping it a balanced 3v3 and nullifying our usual method of gaining control. As a result, Barça had to adapt to new solutions

We saw us take positional flexibility to another level, by making Raphinha occasionally go to the left, or Yamal go to the right and even though this did create space as their movement dragged one of the CBs, Lewandowski, failed to exploit it as he is not a great runner.

The only solution was Lewy to drop deep and provide the pass for Yamal or Raphinha to attack the space behind, but this rarely happened. As a result, even when beating their press, we ended up creating very little danger and just forcing them occasionally to drop their block.

When they lowered their block, Atalanta’s 3-4-1-2 lineup helped them immensely. With three CBs, they could stretch their defence, preventing us from finding space on the wings, with their 3 midfielders matching ours, we also failed to create numerical superiority in central areas

Even when Raphinha or Lewy dropped deep to help overload midfield, Atalanta had no problem sending a CB to follow them, as their three-man backline provided enough coverage. This meant that we struggled to create chances both when they pressed high and when they dropped deep.

The only real opportunities we managed came from winning the ball in midfield and bypassing their counter-press. In these moments, we found more space and created some dangerous counterattacks—but this wasn’t something we could rely on consistently.

As much as Atalanta’s structure helped them defensively, it also limited them offensively preventing them from exploiting our defensive vulnerabilities. Because against Atalanta’s 3-4-1-2, our pressing was straightforward—our front three simply pressed their back three.

This allowed our wingers to stay wide and track back more effectively and also freed our fullbacks from pressing high and leaving spaces. overall avoiding the usual 1v2 situations that Balde and Kounde often find themselves in, especailly with Atlanta having no wingers.

We also applied aggressive counter-pressing when losing the ball, which allowed us to control possession but also exposed us a little defensively with a lot of players out of position, it left large spaces behind to exploit leading to occasionally some danger from them

Overall Atalanta executed their high press brilliantly, preventing us from exploiting the spaces left while defending compactly when they dropped deeper but they played it safe offensively leading to a quiet first half for both teams, with little offensive threat and a 0-0 result

3/Second Half Flick made tactical adjustments that helped us. The most notable change was relying more on Lewy dropping deep. From the 1st half, it was evident that this was the best solution for buildup. By dragging a CB out of position Lewy created spaces for Raphinha and Yamal

While Lewandowski wasn’t always precise with his passing—sometimes making heavy touches or misplaced passes—when he executed his role well, it generated significant danger. This approach directly led to Barcelona’s first goal and a clear missed chance from Yamal.

Additionally, Flick seemed to encourage his players to take on 1v1 situations more often. Atalanta’s man-to-man pressing naturally created these duels, and with Barcelona’s superior individual quality, Flick wanted his players to take advantage

As a result, Yamal made good use of his 1v1 duels with Kolašinac. With support from Koundé and Gavi occupying defenders, Yamal was able to isolate Kolašinac, forcing him into two fouls—one of which led to a yellow card and his eventual substitution.

However, Atalanta also improved offensively in this half. They became bolder in buildup, opting to play out from the back rather than relying solely on long balls. Their key adjustment was having de Roon drop deeper, forcing Pedri to follow him, which created gaps in midfield.

Atalanta also starting to take more advantage of the absence of a natural defensive midfielder in our team was noticeable. Their midfielders had too much freedom near our box, which is what costed us their equalizing goal from Ederson

Flick's then made his subs and even though they made sense, after Ferran’s introduction, the front three lost coordination. Too often, all three forwards stayed in their positions, with no one dropping deep to create space for the others like Lewy was often doing in this half.

With also Atlanta pressing even higher in this period, we struggled in buildup, resorting to either aimless possession or long balls. Despite this, we managed to score a second goal, but it came from a corner, courtesy of poor marking by Atalanta’s defenders on Araújo.

We also dropped our pressing intensity after the goal, allowing their players more time on the ball to deliver accurate long passes, which became a key weapon against our high line with Araújo is still not fully comfortable executing the offside trap, leading to their equalizer.

After Atalanta leveled the score, they lowered their defensive block slightly, allowing Barcelona to regain control. However, despite dominating possession, we struggled to break down Atalanta’s well-structured defense, in this remaining minutes.

4/Conclusion Gasperini’s Atalanta deserves a lot of praise for being the only team that managed to high-press Barcelona while maintaining a high defensive line without conceding a large number of chances. This is a testament to their tactical discipline and defensive organization