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Tactical Analysis: How Flick's Barcelona Won 3-2 Away Against Dortmund (Thread)

Likes and reposts are greatly appreciated 

1/ Lineup
I was worried hearing rumours about Ferran and Frenkie possibly starting, as Dortmund away is one of the toughest fixtures, leaving no room for experimentation or rotation. So it's not anything against those players it's just not the right time to try something new. 

Thankfully, the rumours were false, and Flick went with our strongest lineup, as he should. I’m happy with all the picks—his choice was perfect, so there’s not much to critique here. 

2/ The First Half
Dortmund began by pressing aggressively, however, we bypassed their press comfortably because their pressing structure focused on our right side, which we usually rely on. Flick smartly shifted our buildup to the left, exploiting the spaces Dortmund left there. 

Guirassy marked Cubarsi, and Sabitzer pressed Inigo, but because Sabitzer is a midfielder, he often arrived late, giving Inigo more freedom and also Sabitzer pressing high left one of our midfielders without marking, usually Pedri, because he was the one leaning to the left. 

So In the first 10–15 minutes, we always had numerical advantage in buildup from the left and this setup helped us create several chances and we could've got a lead if it wasn't for our poor finishing, this led for Dortmund to abandon their press, and retreat into their half. 

But even then, Dortmund defensive shape was similar to when their pressed  with Sabitzer joining Guirassy up front, we easily established a 3v2 numerical advantage in midfield (Casado, Pedri, Olmo vs. Reyna, Nmecha) which made central progression easy. 

The problem was that we failed to capitalise on Raphinha’s runs behind their high/mid line, opting for safer passes instead. Flick's approach in this half prioritised control over directness, conserving energy but missing opportunities to exploit Dortmund's high defensive line. 

Our approach was to progress centrally as i explained then get the ball wide and rely on our wide threat. Our right side remained the most dangerous, thanks to Yamal's creativity and support from Koundé. But the left side struggled due to Balde's limited output in the final third 

In our pressing Flick's tactical adjustments were evident. Normally, both wingers press the center-backs, while Lewandowski and Olmo press the pivots, leaving space for the opponent’s wingers. Against Dortmund, only one winger pressed high, while Yamal stayed with his fullback. 

This adjustment limited Dortmund’s buildup from wide areas, particularly on their left, where Koundé was free from high pressing roles so he effectively neutralised Gittens. However, on the right, Duranville frequently found space in 1v1s against Balde, creating a lot of danger. 

At the end of the half, Dortmund began exploiting weaknesses in Flick’s pressing structure. The new system made it harder for them to build wide but easier to progress centrally, as Lewy’s less intense pressing on the CBs compared to how Yamal presses in the usual system. 

Also occasionally, the press from Pedri or Casado came late especially when their midfielders drop deep it's hard for our pivots to follow them, and this gave their midfielders more freedom and eased their buildup so they were able to create some danger. 

Overall, we controlled the half well, and with better finishing, we could have gone into halftime ahead. But you can't expect Dortmund to give you full control in their stadium for the whole game, and the fact that we missed our half shouldn't happen again in big games. 

3/ The Second Half
Dortmund continued their central buildup, as seen at the end of the first half, effectively bypassing our press. With Lewy and Rapha showing signs of fatigue, our counter-pressing intensity dropped, allowing them to attack and keep possession more comfortably. 

On our side, buildup became a struggle as Dortmund shifted their pressing focus to our left side, nullifying the numerical advantage we created earlier. While Guirassy continued marking Cubarsí, forcing us to build from the left, where Dortmund had compacted their press. 

With no numerical superiority, we relied heavily on the individual brilliance of Pedri to escape tight spaces and deliver a precise long ball or just advance the ball to Olmo like what happened in our first goal, but such moments are rare and unsustainable throughout the game. 

That's why we struggled in consistently beating their press, but when we did, their high press left large spaces in behind so attacking opportunities became easier to exploit, leading to more dangerous chances compared the first half with also better finishing from our attackers. 

And that's the reason we were able to score 3 goals and create more danger in general in the second half, despite having much less control. Also their focus on pressing our left side gave Yamal and Koundé more freedom on the right, which contributed to our second goal. 

Defensively, we struggled, particularly with crosses. Flick’s reliance on the offside trap as the primary strategy for defending crosses proved risky and ineffective. This approach led to Dortmund’s penalty and most of their dangerous moments. 

Opponents are increasingly prepared for our offside trap especially with midfielders runs. The offside trap should primarily target attackers while for midfielders making late runs, defenders need to mark them instead of trying to trap them like in what happened in their 2nd goal 

5/Subs
Flick’s substitutions of Ferran and Fermin added fresh legs, which added more intensity to our pressing, but Dortmund were still able to bypass it, because the problem was more in the structure rather than the intensity. 

But most importantly this subs added pace that improved our ability to counterattack and exploit Dortmund’s defensive gaps especially Ferran who was able to score two goals from the two chances he got. 

For the sub of Frenkie, i think Flick wanted to keep pedri deep on the left while adding another controller who can support the buildup from the right, but things didn't work as expected, and FDJ wasn't able to add much in that role, i think Gavi would've been a better fit. 

4/ Conclusion
Offensively, I’m reasonably satisfied with the team’s performance. In both halves, we attacked well and created numerous dangerous opportunities, even when control slipped away in the second half. However, defensively, there’s significant room for improvement. 

Teams are now clearly aware of our offside trap strategy and are exploiting it effectively. This means we need to execute it more precisely or, better yet, develop a nuanced understanding of when to rely on it and when to opt for alternative defensive solutions. 

The offside trap cannot remain our singular answer to every defensive challenge. Balancing our defensive strategy with adaptability will be key to handling well-prepared opponents in the future. 

At the end of the day we got a crucial 3 points in a very tough stadium and we jumped to the second place in the Champions league standing so i can only be happy with this game despite defensive problems. 

End of thread thank you for reading, like and repost if you enjoyed it, give us your thoughts in the comments, and follow me for more threads like this 

Tactical Analysis: How Flick’s Barcelona Dominated Real Betis 5-1 in the Copa del Rey (Thread🧵)

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1/ Lineup:
Let's start as usual with the lineup. Flick surprised everyone with his choices for this game. While resting Casado and Balde and replacing them with FDJ and Martin seemed like standard squad rotation, the big shock was Dani Olmo starting as a false 9 instead of Lewy. 

This decision seemed to serve two purposes: rotation and experimentation. Given the lack of a reliable backup striker, it was a smart move to explore an alternative solution for situations where Lewandowski might be unavailable due to injury or poor form. 

But It was definitely a bold choice to test this setup for the first time against a strong opponent like Betis. We hadn’t seen Olmo in the false 9 role before, nor had this particular midfield trio played together this season. However, the gamble paid off. 

2/ First Half:
Betis opted for a low block in a compact 4-4-2 defensive structure rather than pressing us high. However, Pellegrini, like the rest of us, didn’t anticipate  the unexpected changes in the lineup which disrupted Betis’s defensive setup, and here’s how it unfolded: 

While Betis didn’t press high, they ensured their Striker and CAM applied pressure on our center-backs to restrict their ability to play line-breaking passes. But Frenkie dropping deep between the center-backs completely dismantled this plan. 

Since their midfield pivots couldn’t follow Frenkie without leaving a gaping hole in their defensive shape, it created a 3v2 advantage for Barça during the buildup. Frenkie easily carried the ball forward, bypassing Betis’s first defensive line. 

Even when Betis tried to focus on blocking Frenkie, Cubarsi stepped up and executed the same role effectively, making Barça’s buildup smooth and granting us total control of possession. 

Frenkie dropping deep didn’t weaken the midfield because Olmo smartly covered the space by moving into midfield which created another numerical advantage, with Pedri, Gavi, and Olmo consistently outnumbering Betis’s two pivots. 

Betis seemed prepared for Lewandowski’s usual movements, expecting him to drag their center-backs out of position to create space for Raphinha and Yamal. Their plan was to keep their center-backs disciplined and not follow the striker. But the twist was having Olmo intead of Lewy 

Because leaving Lewandowski unmarked when he drops deep would likely lead to nothing, as he lacks the creativity to exploit the freedom he have but leaving Olmo unmarked allowed him the freedom to dictate play, pick passes, and exploit gaps in Betis’s defense. 

Olmo’s false 9 role was executed brilliantly. While a traditional false 9 relies on wingers moving into the box when he drops deep, Barça adjusted by having Yamal stay wide to create width. Instead, Gavi frequently took up the role of attacking the box alongside Raphinha. 

This trio—Olmo, Gavi, and Raphinha—constantly interchanged positions, creating spaces for each other. The first goal was a perfect example, where Olmo and Raphinha’s movements opened up space for Gavi to finish. Not to forget the brilliant work from Pedri to initiate the attack 

We also relied heavily on the right side but instead of directly overloading the right, we built play on the left, drawing Betis’s focus. Then With quick passing sequences or a direct switch from Pedri/Gavi, we shifted play to the right, putting Yamal and Koundé in 2v1 situations 

And due to Yamal's creativity and great passing ability, with also Kounde's great movement, barca were able to create a lot of danger from this situations, including our second goal and another goal that was disallowed due to a very unlucky offside. 

One more thing i liked was that despite not having a natural striker, Barça maintained a strong presence in the box. When the ball was wide, both Olmo and Raphinha positioned themselves centrally, offering the kind of threat you’d expect from a traditional striker. 

Defensively, Barça’s dominance in possession allowed them to counter-press immediately upon losing the ball, preventing Betis from launching effective counters. When Betis tried to build from the back, Barca relied on their usual aggressive pressing structure. 

But Betis used a clever strategy of stretching their center-backs wide and initiating play on the left to draw Koundé and Araújo out of position which forces Gerard Martin to drop deeper to cover, allowing Betis to switch play quickly to the right where there was no pressure. 

But for this to work Betis had to not loose the ball on the left side, and stay press resistant, before switching the play to the right , which worked once or twice, but in the other occasions, Araujo and Kounde's intensity were too much to deal with. 

Another minor issue was on our left side, where Raphinha’s central role made it difficult for him to provide defensive cover with Martin, leaving Martin in 1v2 situations at times. Betis’s only real chance in the first half came from this vulnerability but Pena saved us. 

But overall the team still defended well and the first half was outstanding for Barça. The team showed total control, beautiful passing sequences, and constant attacking threat, scoring two goals and nearly more if not for an unlucky offside. 

3/Second Half
Betis pressed more frequently, though not consistently. Their pressing came in bursts, alternating between high pressing and dropping deep into their usual low block. However, with the quality in Barça’s midfield, bypassing their press was relatively straightforward 

Through quick directional changes or tight short passing sequences, Barça not only navigated Betis’s press but also exploited the spaces left in their defense. These gaps became more prominent as Betis pushed forward to attack, which directly contributed to Raphinha’s third goal. 

When Betis opted for their deeper defensive shape, they aimed to remain compact, particularly in central areas, to deny spaces for Raphinha, Olmo, and Gavi to operate between the lines. This, however, left the Barça midfielders, free to dictate play near the edge of the box. 

With their creativity and vision, they repeatedly found passes to break Betis’s defensive line. One such moment led to Ferran’s fourth goal, and two other passes led in a two disallowed goals for Yamal due to a unlucky offsides. 

Barça continued to apply the principles established in the first half, particularly with Frenkie dropping between the center-backs to facilitate an effortless buildup. The numerical superiority in midfield remained effective even after Pedri and Gavi were substituted. 

demonstrating the team’s tactical discipline. This structure played a key role in the fifth goal, as we can see the numerical advantage led to the freedom of Fermin lopez who was then able to provide a pass to Yamal putting him in an easy 1v1 situation with the keeper. 

Defensively, Barça maintained their intensity. Even with a significant lead, they sustained a high press. Despite the midfield trio of Frenkie, Olmo, and Fermín—arguably weaker defensively, Betis rarely managed to progress into dangerous areas. 

but when they did progress, occasional weaknesses in Barça’s midfield marking surfaced. Even so, these moments were few and far between. The only goal Barça conceded came from an unfortunate individual error by Koundé, whose misplaced action led to an unnecessary penalty. 

4/Conclusion
This match was undoubtedly one of the most entertaining Barcelona performances of the season. It wasn’t just the goals or the relentless attacking play that made it special, but also the sheer technical quality displayed across the pitch. 

The inclusion of so many technically gifted players, combined with the use of a false 9, evoked memories of the old tiki-taka era, with its smooth passing, minimal touches, and intricate triangles. This system is very interesting, and i want to see more of it in the future. 

Tactical Analysis: How Flick’s Barcelona won 5-4 against Benfica in the Champions League (Thread🧵)  

Likes and Reposts are greatly appreciated!🙌 

1/Lineup:
Flick's only misstep in the lineup was starting Szczęsny, which proved to be a significant error. Considering Szczęsny’s costly mistake in the Clasico, Flick should have realized that the team’s high defensive line strategy demands a goalkeeper proficient in sweeping. 

Unfortunately, Szczęsny’s weaknesses in this area were evident once again. The consequences were clear, particularly on Benfica’s second and third goals, both of which I believe Peña’s consistent sweeping abilities could have prevented. 

2/First half
Benfica tried to high press early on but we managed to bypass it with relative ease, especially down the left flank. Balde’s excellent ball-carrying ability played a key role, as he frequently dribbled past his marker and drew midfielders toward him, freeing up Pedri 

Pedri, in turn, used his exceptional vision and passing to progress the play. However, Barcelona struggled to capitalize on breaking the press. Unlike our usual quick transitions, our attacks were slow, giving Benfica enough time to recover and drop into a compact low block 

Benfica’s defensive transitions were remarkably fast making it difficult for for us to exploit spaces directly. Even when Lewy dropped deep to drag CBs out of position and create space for Rapha, Benfica’s disciplined defense refused to follow him and maintained their structure. 

When faced with their low block, we avoided our previous game mistake of relying heavily on wide plays, which would have suited their defensive setup, because a low block wants to force you to go wide and make you rely on crosses so we focused on attacking through the centre. 

This was achieved by overloading the central areas with Lewy dropping deep, Rapha cutting inside, or Pedri/Gavi advancing. While this tactic consistently gave us a numerical advantage in central areas and allowed for line-breaking passes, the issue lay in execution. 

Players receiving the ball between the lines—Raphinha, Gavi, and Lewy—failed to make an impact. They frequently lost possession through poor touches, inaccurate passes, or weak finishing, which hampered Barcelona’s ability to create clear chances despite easy central progression. 

Benfica also prepared well to neutralize Lamine Yamal on Barcelona’s right flank. They anticipated Barça’s tendency to overload on the left and switch play to Yamal on the right. Their left-back resisted shifting too far centrally, staying close to Yamal to limit his space 

While this created gaps between their left-back and their left center-back, Barcelona failed to exploit them, as most players were focused on the left-side overload. Despite heavy marking, Yamal still managed to beat his man on occasions but couldn’t create anything significant. 

Koundé and Gavi, his nearest teammates, were below their usual standards and failed to combine effectively with him. Even when Yamal dragged defenders centrally to open space for Koundé, the latter failed to take advantage, offering little in terms of attacking output. 

When we tried to attack directly from the overloaded side, the left side, although Balde contributed effectively in buildup play, his final delivery in terms of crosses and chances was lacking. The only notable opportunity came from a Raphinha cross that Yamal missed. 

Defensively we used our usual pressing setup, which worked a lot of times, helping us dominate possession and win the ball in dangerous areas (like the chance Raphinha missed near the end of the half), but it also caused us a lot of defensive problems. 

First the press itself was beaten a couple of times, mainly because Yamal’s pressing intensity was inconsistent, often allowing Benfica’s goalkeeper to easily find the left center-back or left-back, which disrupted Barcelona’s press and opened up spaces for them to beat it. 

Even when they failed to bypass it and played long balls, if in any occasion we loose an aerial duel or a second ball, it left our fullbacks exposed, as the high-pressing wingers couldn’t recover in time, often resulting in 2v1 situations against Balde or mostly Koundé. 

Also on several occasions, Barça seemed unprepared to press after losing possession, leaving the player on the ball with a lot of freedom, combined with a high defensive line, it allowed Benfica to play long balls that bypassed Barça’s offside trap easily. 

Another problem was with Pedri playing a more advanced role alongside Gavi, we often saw Casado isolated as the lone pivot. This lack of midfield cover was exposed during transitions, such as in the sequence that led to Benfica’s penalty and third goal. 

Overall defensive vulnerabilities, compounded by individual errors, led to 3 conceded goals. With the lack of usual attacking sharpness, it was a poor half, and being behind at halftime was a fair reflection of our performance despite it being mainly due to individual errors. 

3/Second half
Unfortunately, the defensive issues persisted, leaving Koundé in 1v2 situations, allowing the player on the ball a lot of freedom,... . As a result, they created some dangerous chances early in the half, though they failed to capitalize and score a 4th goal 

On the attacking side, there were noticeable improvements. Barça began relying more on the left flank, giving Balde opportunities for 1v1 situations rather than overburdening Yamal as the sole wide threat. Balde's passing also improved, leading to some dangerous chances. 

Significantly, Yamal was granted more positional freedom, moving centrally or to the left instead of sticking strictly to the width. This created more solutions. Koundé often held the width on the right, exploiting space left by Benfica's LB, who was focused on marking Yamal. 

With Pedri gaining more freedom and being able to have the ball in comfortable situations close to the box because Benfica lowered their block even more in this half, Pedri was able to exploit Kounde's freedom with perfect passes but Koundé struggled with poor attacking output. 

Around the 60th minutes with barca still trailing by 2 goals, Flick introduced Frenkie de Jong and Fermín López for Casado and Gavi. This substitution had an immediate impact. Fermín played as a left winger, while Raphinha moved centrally as a CAM, leaning toward the right. 

This tactical shift allowed Raphinha to support Yamal more effectively and exploit the space between Benfica's LCB and LB that we talked about earlier. Frenkie de Jong, meanwhile, improved the team’s ball progression with his precise passing and ability to find Raphinha’s runs. 

With Frenkie controlling deeper areas, Pedri advanced more freely, constantly positioning himself between the lines and excelling in tight spaces. This resolved Barça's earlier issue of failing to capitalize on central progression, as Pedri provided key passes in the final third. 

Despite these improvements and several great chances, poor finishing continued to plague us and we weren't able to score, even when Benfica’s goalkeeper gifted us a goal with a mistake, we immediately gifted them a goal back with a miscommunication between Szczęsny and Araújo. 

With little time left, Flick made bold changes by substituting both fullbacks for Eric García and Ferran Torres. The structure shifted to an aggressive 3-2-4-1, focusing on overloading the right flank rather than overloading the left and relying on long switches to Yamal. 

Raphinha played wider, occasionally switching roles with Yamal, while Ferran acted as a second striker. This setup created constant triangles and numerical advantage on the right side, leading to a lot of danger including Yamal winning a penalty, bringing us back into the game. 

On the left, Fermín provided width. Though not his preferred role, he found plenty of space because of the overload we made on the right so he was able to contribute by even a random cross or winning corners, one of which led to the equalizer after Pedri's wonderful delivery. 

Even after equalizing, we continued to press for a fifth goal, and we didn't change our risky structure, leaving significant gaps at the back which was very greedy as Benfica nearly scored a winner, but Szczęsny made a crucial save. 

Tactical Analysis of why and how Flick's Barclona won 5-2 against Real Madrid in the Super Cup final (Thread🧵)

Likes and Reposts are much appreciated ! 

1/Lineup
Flick adhered to the saying, "If it’s not broke, don’t fix it," by keeping the same lineup that secured a 2-0 victory against Bilbao. Nine of the starting spots were almost guaranteed, but there were uncertainties regarding the goalkeeper and the third midfielder. 

For the midfield position, Flick opted for Gavi over Olmo, which made sense given Gavi’s recent form and the fact that Olmo hadn’t started in the last 3 games. Gavi’s intensity provided the defensive balance the team needed, outweighing Olmo’s creativity in this particular match 

As for the GK, the decision between Szczesny and Peña went in favour of Szczesny. While I agreed with this choice before the game, I must admit it turned out to be a mistake. Against a team like Real Madrid with pacy forwards, a sweeper keeper is crucial when playing a high line. 

1/First Half
Ancelotti approached this game with a low/mid-block defensive strategy, avoiding a high press likely due to lessons learned from their previous 4-0 loss. His plan was clearly to let Barça control possession and rely on counters using Madrid’s fast attacking trio. 

However things didn't go as he expected, as barca barely lost possession in defence or midfield because Ancelotti exaggerated the idea of not pressing, giving total freedom to our CBs and not even closing the passing lanes to our pivots or pressing them. 

He essentially handed us total control, which helped our players remain physically fresher, so in the rare occasion where possession was lost, we were able to implement intense counter-pressing preventing them from creating a lot of dangerous counters as they only created one. 

Flick's pressing structure also made it impossible for them to build any attack from behind, as Yamal and Rapha led the high aggressive press with Gavi and Lewy backing them up while Koundé and Balde pushed high on the flanks which is a very risky structure if they beat it. 

Despite the risks of this approach, Flick likely anticipated Madrid’s limitations in buildup: no ball-playing keeper, no controller in midfield, and error-prone fullbacks. So he probably expected madrid to just rely on ineffective long balls, which is exactly what happened. 

But what we've been talking about so far is how barca managed to control the game, keep the ball and prevent madrid from attacking the spaces we left behind, but how did we turn that control and possession into danger, how did we manage to beat Real Madrid's low block ? 

Real Madrid defended in a 4-2-3-1 structure. Vinícius tracked Kounde, while Rodrygo covered Balde, leaving Bellingham and Mbappé to apply occasional "pressure" on our CBs. This defensive setup left Camavinga and Valverde often in 2v3 situations against Pedri, Casado, and Gavi. 

Even when Bellingham didn't go up and stayed in midfield, we saw either Lewandowksi dropping deep to drag Camavinga with him him and free up Gavi from marking or we also saw Raphinha going central to force Valverde to mark him and free up Pedri. 

So we always had that numerical advantage in midfield and the player on the ball wasn't only free from high press but also always had a free option(s) to pass to very easily which led to a total midfield domination and a very easy central progression 

More importantly barca tried to capitalize on madrid weak side, their right side, Raphinha’s fluid movement caused miscommunication between Rodrygo and Vázquez. As Raphinha alternated between wide and central positions, freeing up Balde to attack the vacated space. 

Raphina also capitalized on the horrible marking from both players on his side (Tchouameni and  Vazquez) with the big space between them he was always ended up free when a cross was played from Kounde or Gavi, leading to two dangerous headers, one of which resulted in a goal. 

Even with our focus on their right side, we also attacked well on their left flank, despite Ancelotti’s intent to isolate Yamal in a 1v2 situation with Camavinga and Mendy, Flick ensured support from Kounde and especially Gavi who was always dragging Cama with his smart movement 

We also saw the same clever combination from last game where Gavi drags Camavinga wide, creating space in Madrid’s midfield. Lewy exploited this gap, forcing Rüdiger to follow him and opening a further gap in Madrid’s defense, which Yamal capitalized on for Barcelona's first goal 

After our third goal, we eased the pressing, allowing Madrid slightly longer possession spells. However, the midfield press remained strong, denying Madrid opportunities to build meaningful attacks and also slightly reducing the high line to prevent any dangerous long balls. 

While Madrid pushed forward and left more defensive gaps, we relied on counters and direct plays to exploit their high line, and especially the spaces left from Vazquez on the right side, This led to a fourth goal, capping off an outstanding first half with a dominant 4-1 lead. 

This half was a masterclass in tactical execution by Flick. Barça’s ability to control possession, press effectively, and exploit Madrid’s defensive frailties resulted in a near-flawless display, with the only blemish being Madrid’s lone counterattack that led to a goal. 

2/Second Half
Real Madrid, trailing by three goals, shifted to a high press in an attempt to recover the game. However, their pressing was neither well-constructed nor particularly intense, allowing Barcelona to consistently bypass it and maintain control. 

A crucial factor in countering their man-to-man press was the positional fluidity of our midfielders. One notable sequence involved Pedri and Casado swapping positions, which freed Casado to deliver a perfectly timed pass to Raphinha, leading to Barca’s fifth goal. 

Defensively, just like the game against Bilbao we saw the great defensive adjustments continue, relying less on the offside trap. For instance, when Bellingham attempted runs in behind, the defenders opted to track back and outpace him rather than step up for an offside. 

The game’s dynamics changed significantly following Szczęsny’s red card, which allowed Real Madrid to immediately score a second goal and left Barca down to 10 men with over 30 minutes remaining. Flick reacted quickly by introducing Dani Olmo and Peña for Gavi and Yamal. 

We shifted into a 4-4-1 defensive shape. Despite being a man down, Barca defended exceptionally well, with Pedri and Casado cutting off passing lanes in midfield, Olmo and Raphinha supporting their fullbacks to prevent wide threat and the entire team showing great discipline. 

i'm not gonna lie i felt like the Yamal sub was a little rushed after they scored their second goal, with more than 30 minutes left to play with 10 men i thought we could use a difference make like him, but it didn't really matter as we defended really well and didn't concede. 

But we did not merely sit back we focused on retaining the ball to buy time and frustrate their opponents. Pedri and Olmo played vital roles in maintaining possession under pressure with their technical ability, while Lewa’s hold-up play and dominance in aerials proved invaluable 

The game was basically done after our fifth goal, and even with a red card Real Madrid never came close to staging a comeback, but the numerical advantage saved them from conceding more goals. 

4/Conclusion:
This performance was a testament to Flick's tactical acumen, showcasing his ability to adapt and solve challenges while staying true to his core principles. The team's balance of discipline, creativity, and intensity highlighted the fruits of his efforts. 

As well as the players' dedication to executing his vision. This victory is a well-deserved reward for the hard work of both the manager and the squad, and it serves as a promising foundation for what could be the first of many trophies to come under Flick’s guidance. 

End of thread, thank you for reading, like and repost if you enjoyed it and follow me for more threads like this 

Tactical analysis: Why and how Flick’s Barcelona drew 2-2 with Gasperini’s Atalanta (Thread🧵)

Likes and reposts appreciated!

1/Lineup
Despite a draw being enough to secure second place and qualify, Flick didn’t opt for full rotation. He understood that if we won and Liverpool lost, we could finish first, which would mean more prize money. On the other hand, a loss could drop us to fourth, 

Not only reducing revenue but also increasing the chances of facing tougher opponents in future knockout rounds. Because of this, Flick kept rotation minimal, only resting Cubarsí and Casado in favor of De Jong and Eric García. 

Judging by how the game unfolded, I think Flick, like me, didn’t expect Atalanta to press like this, he probably thought they will sit deep and rely on counters. If he had anticipated their press I believe he would have preferred starting Casado and especially Fermín, and Ferran. 

Fermín and Ferran are better at making runs and exploiting high defensive lines than Lewy and Gavi, while In Frenkie’s case, sacrificing Casado’s defensive security for him, only makes sense when facing a low block, where Frenkie's ability to break lines is more valuable. 

Another possible explanation is that, regardless of Atalanta’s pressing approach, Flick simply wanted more control and possession instead of our usual high-risk, direct football—to at least secure the draw we needed, which is something players like Gavi and FDJ can provide better 

2/First half
Atalanta tried to press high, which is risky, given that almost every team that has attempted to press us with a high defensive line has either conceded multiple goals or at least given up several big chances. But Atalanta executed it better than any team we’ve faced 

First they tried to close our best side in buildup our left side, they never left Balde any space, and they always kept him and Pedri in a 2v3, and even though Pedri usually can still get out with the ball even with numerical disadvantage, today, he was simply not on his best day 

Their main strategy was a strict man-to-man press: De Ketelaere on Araujo, Retegui on García, Pašalić on De Jong, De Roon on Pedri, and Éderson on Gavi. Their wingbacks pressed our fullbacks when the ball went wide, while their back three tracked our front three 

Normally, Barça can break this type of press through positional rotations, to confuse markers. However, Atalanta’s defenders were highly disciplined, as you can see even with FDJ and Pedri switching positions, and Gavi leaning more to the left, the same markers are still on them. 

Even when Frenkie dropped deep between the center-backs to create our usual 3v2 numerical advantage in buildup, Pašalić stuck with him, keeping it a balanced 3v3 and nullifying our usual method of gaining control. As a result, Barça had to adapt to new solutions 

We saw us take positional flexibility to another level, by making Raphinha occasionally go to the left, or Yamal go to the right and even though this did create space as their movement dragged one of the CBs, Lewandowski, failed to exploit it as he is not a great runner. 

The only solution was Lewy to drop deep and provide the pass for Yamal or Raphinha to attack the space behind, but this rarely happened. As a result, even when beating their press, we ended up creating very little danger and just forcing them occasionally to drop their block. 

When they lowered their block, Atalanta’s 3-4-1-2 lineup helped them immensely. With three CBs, they could stretch their defence, preventing us from finding space on the wings, with their 3 midfielders matching ours, we also failed to create numerical superiority in central areas 

Even when Raphinha or Lewy dropped deep to help overload midfield, Atalanta had no problem sending a CB to follow them, as their three-man backline provided enough coverage. This meant that we struggled to create chances both when they pressed high and when they dropped deep. 

The only real opportunities we managed came from winning the ball in midfield and bypassing their counter-press. In these moments, we found more space and created some dangerous counterattacks—but this wasn’t something we could rely on consistently. 

As much as Atalanta’s structure helped them defensively, it also limited them offensively preventing them from exploiting our defensive vulnerabilities. Because against Atalanta’s 3-4-1-2, our pressing was straightforward—our front three simply pressed their back three. 

This allowed our wingers to stay wide and track back more effectively and also freed our fullbacks from pressing high and leaving spaces. overall avoiding the usual 1v2 situations that Balde and Kounde often find themselves in, especailly with Atlanta having no wingers. 

We also applied aggressive counter-pressing when losing the ball, which allowed us to control possession but also exposed us a little defensively with a lot of players out of position, it left large spaces behind to exploit leading to occasionally some danger from them 

Overall Atalanta executed their high press brilliantly, preventing us from exploiting the spaces left while defending compactly when they dropped deeper but they played it safe offensively leading to a quiet first half for both teams, with little offensive threat and a 0-0 result 

3/Second Half
Flick made tactical adjustments that helped us. The most notable change was relying more on Lewy dropping deep. From the 1st half, it was evident that this was the best solution for buildup. By dragging a CB out of position Lewy created spaces for Raphinha and Yamal 

While Lewandowski wasn’t always precise with his passing—sometimes making heavy touches or misplaced passes—when he executed his role well, it generated significant danger. This approach directly led to Barcelona’s first goal and a clear missed chance from Yamal. 

Additionally, Flick seemed to encourage his players to take on 1v1 situations more often. Atalanta’s man-to-man pressing naturally created these duels, and with Barcelona’s superior individual quality, Flick wanted his players to take advantage 

As a result, Yamal made good use of his 1v1 duels with Kolašinac. With support from Koundé and Gavi occupying defenders, Yamal was able to isolate Kolašinac, forcing him into two fouls—one of which led to a yellow card and his eventual substitution. 

However, Atalanta also improved offensively in this half. They became bolder in buildup, opting to play out from the back rather than relying solely on long balls. Their key adjustment was having de Roon drop deeper, forcing Pedri to follow him, which created gaps in midfield. 

Atalanta also starting to take more advantage of the absence of a natural defensive midfielder in our team was noticeable. Their midfielders had too much freedom near our box, which is what costed us their equalizing goal from Ederson 

Flick's then made his subs and even though they made sense, after Ferran’s introduction, the front three lost coordination. Too often, all three forwards stayed in their positions, with no one dropping deep to create space for the others like Lewy was often doing in this half. 

With also Atlanta pressing even higher in this period, we struggled in buildup, resorting to either aimless possession or long balls. Despite this, we managed to score a second goal, but it came from a corner, courtesy of poor marking by Atalanta’s defenders on Araújo. 

We also dropped our pressing intensity after the goal, allowing  their players more time on the ball to deliver accurate long passes, which became a key weapon against our high line with Araújo is still not fully comfortable executing the offside trap, leading to their equalizer. 

After Atalanta leveled the score, they lowered their defensive block slightly, allowing Barcelona to regain control. However, despite dominating possession, we struggled to break down Atalanta’s well-structured defense, in this remaining minutes. 

4/Conclusion
Gasperini’s Atalanta deserves a lot of praise for being the only team that managed to high-press Barcelona while maintaining a high defensive line without conceding a large number of chances. This is a testament to their tactical discipline and defensive organization 

Tactical Analysis of why and how Flick's Barcelona won 2-0 Against Valverde's Bilbao (Thread)

Likes and Reposts are much appreciated 

1/ Lineup
I appreciated Flick's decision to continue relying on Gavi for the third spot in midfield. In the absence of Olmo, Gavi is undoubtedly the best choice, and Flick's trust in him clearly paid off with his impressive performance. 

Yamal starting was also expected—if he’s fit and ready, no manager would bench him in a game of this magnitude. However, the biggest surprise was Szczesny starting over Peña. Rumors suggest Peña was benched because he arrived late to training, and whether that’s true or not,... 

I like the sense of competition it brings. Despite the limited sample size, Szczesny showed he’s ready to step in whenever needed. With more game time and rhythm, he might even prove to be on a better level than Peña. 

2/The first half
Bilbao began the 1st half with an aggressive high press in our half, but we had multiple solutions to bypass their pressing structure effectively. One of the best approaches was utilizing the right side, where a clever combination between Gavi and Yamal stood out 

Gavi often moved wide, dragging Bilbao's pivot and opening gaps in their midfield, which Yamal or Lewandowski exploited by dropping deep to receive the ball from Koundé. This was the most effective way to beat their press but not the only one. 

Another solution involved freeing up Cubarsi by having Szczesny hold the ball until Bilbao’s striker have to leave Cubarsi and press Szczesny, while also closing the direct passing line to Cubarsi so Szczesny would get the ball to Pedri, who then passes it easily to cubarsi. 

We also saw Lewandowski drop deep on the left to form a triangle with Pedri and Balde, that made buildup easier and also dragging defenders to create space for Raphinha, Yamal, and Gavi, who were all very good at exploiting that space with their impressive movement. 

Even without Lewy, Balde's dribbling and Pedri's creativity were enough for us to advance the ball on the left side like what happened in the sequence of our first goal with Balde dragging 2 defenders to create the space for Pedri who quickly realised it and exploited that space 

So combining these methods and solutions allowed us to bypass Bilbao's press consistently. After breaking their press, the team either attacked the space directly or controlled possession, forcing Bilbao to retreat and when that happened we relied a lot on overloads. 

Especially overloading the left side to draw defenders, then relying on Pedri or Inigo to switch the play quickly to Lamine or Koundé on the right, who found ample space to exploit with this strategy and created a lot of danger in the right side. 

on top of this great attacking display we also pressed with high intensity, Gavi's presence helped our pressing structure, because it released Yamal from pressing on CBs as Gavi was the one doing that work with Raphinha, so Bilbao failed to keep the ball or build any good attacks 

But this wasn't how we played the whole half, this were the first 20-25 minutes were we completely dominated, with high possession, dangerous chances, and a well-deserved goal, that could've been more then one goal, if we took our chances better. 

However, the dynamic shifted in the latter part of the half. Barça reduced their pressing intensity and dropped their defensive block slightly, which felt more like a tactical decision—possibly to conserve energy ahead of a potential Clásico/final—than a lack of effort. 

There were clearly some good defensive adjustments including tracking midfield runners and marking attackers better during crosses rather than relying solely on the offside trap, an improvement I’ve wanted to see for a long time. 

Despite positives, some issues persisted, particularly the lack of chemistry between Íñigo and Balde in marking players like Iñaki Williams, who frequently moved from right to center and caused some problems but we held up well and conceded few dangerous chances in the first half 

So i don't think our defence was the problem in this part of the half, but the problem is that we lost a lot of possession and control. The earlier solutions for beating Bilbao's press faded, and the team became overly reliant on Lewandowski dropping deep. 

Unfortunately, the over reliance on this approach led to a lot of poor touches and misplaced passes, which led to frequent turnovers. The balance between direct play and possession from the first 20-25 minutes was lost, as attacks became rushed and much less effective. 

Overall, the half can be divided into two parts: an opening phase of dominance with fluid attacking and control, followed by a phase where control slipped, but the team defended solidly and maintained the lead. 

3/The second Half
Barça returned to high pressing and aggressive attacking. Flick's approach seemed clear: go all out in the early minutes, score a second goal to secure the game, then shift to a safer and more defensive tactic while resting key players who need rest. 

This plan worked perfectly, as the high press allowed us to win the ball in dangerous areas multiple times, including the sequence that led to our second goal. The earlier issue of over-reliance on Lewandowski dropping deep on the left was also addressed. 

We saw a return of effective right-side combinations involving Gavi, Yamal, and Koundé, as well as increased positional flexibility between Pedri and Casado. This movement created confusion for Bilbao’s midfield and granted Pedri more freedom to dictate play. 

After scoring the second goal, the team dropped their defensive line slightly and adopted a safer, less intense pressing strategy, similar to the latter stages of the first half. However, unlike earlier, Barça managed to maintain a better balance between direct play and control. 

Bilbao players began to show signs of fatigue, which forced them to drop their press in certain phases, that's when we focused on retaining possession and controlling the tempo. Conversely, when they pressed, we played more direct through quick build-ups, long balls and counters. 

The directness proved more successful than in the first half, as there were much more spaces left by them, we created several opportunities to kill the game with a third goal. Unfortunately, poor finishing, particularly from Lewandowski and Raphinha, kept the scoreline unchanged. 

The substitutions brought fresh energy to the pressing game, crucial for maintaining defensive intensity. Ferran, in particular, provided a noticeable improvement in pressing compared to Lewandowski. Despite these positives, the performance was far from perfect 

While the offside trap was less relied upon and better executed, defensive vulnerabilities persisted. The recurring issue of who should mark Iñaki Williams between Íñigo and Balde remained unresolved in this half, leading to dangerous situations 

Additionally, individual errors, such as Frenkie and Raphinha losing possession in risky areas, put us under unnecessary pressure. Fortunately, Szczesny’s composure and timely interventions, along with the offside trap, prevented us from conceding. 

4/Conclusion: 
Overall, this was an excellent game—arguably one of the most tactically balanced performances I’ve seen under Flick. He demonstrated a clear understanding of when to press high and when to drop back, when to play direct, and when to focus on maintaining control. 

The team alternated effectively between relying on the offside trap and marking players directly, while also utilizing a variety of solutions to beat the press and launch attacks. It was a versatile and well-rounded display. 

However, some issues persist, including inefficiency in front of goal, lapses in concentration leading to errors, and lingering defensive gaps. Addressing at least some of these problems will be crucial for securing victory in the final. 

Tactical Analysis of Barcelona vs Atletico Madrid (Thread)

Likes and reposts are much appreciated. 

1/ Lineup
The biggest surprise was Olmo being benched while Fermín and Gavi started. Despite Olmo's recent struggles, I wanted him to start because regaining form in a big game like this could’ve been invaluable. I understand Flick’s preference for Gavi to provide more control... 

and also help win the midfield battle but even then, Olmo could’ve started at LW and likely done everything Fermín did, but better. But overall, while I think the lineup could’ve been stronger with Olmo as CAM or LW,  Gavi performed well so i don't think it was a bad lineup. 

2/ The First Half
Atletico started with their usual defensive style, compacting in their half and avoiding a high press. However, Flick's system changes were crucial in breaking their deep block effectively. The key change was shifting from a 4-2-3-1 to more of a 4-3-3. 

Casado played as the lone pivot with Pedri and Gavi as interiors. This structure allowed for easier central progression, utilizing both Gavi and Pedri in Zone 14 instead of relying solely on a single CAM which usually leads to failure to attack centrally if Olmo is not on his day 

Against Atletico's 4-4-2 defensive shape, this setup created numerical superiority centrally, we focused on trying to free Pedri by making Inigo Martinez hold the ball until De Paul (Pedri's marker) is forced to leave his position and press on Inigo, Leaving Pedri free 

As Alvarez was busy marking Cubarsi while Griezmann had the job to mark Casado, so only De Paul can go up and press Inigo. In general the key to everything was freeing Pedri and getting the ball to him in a comfortable position, and from that on we rely on his creativity. 

Pedri then have the choice to either find the right pass behind the defence centrally or to go wide, and that gets us to the second important change in Flick's system, which is how he adjusted how width was maintained by making both of our wingers stay wide unlike usual. 

So it was Fermin who hold the width on the left while Balde underlapped. this was because we had both Gavi and Pedri occupy the zone behind the ST, unlike usual were our LW had to go central to support the CAM in that zone this time both wingers were able to stay wide. 

While neither winger excels in 1v1 situations, this approach worked because they were well-supported. Raphinha combined with Gavi and Kounde, while Fermín linked with Balde and Pedri, forming effective triangles to maintain ball circulation and create chances. 

Crossing was another major factor. With Raphinha and Fermín delivering from wide areas our crosses were more effective compared to relying on Balde or Kounde. This approach allowed us to not only rely on central attack but also threaten from both flanks despite Yamal's absence. 

it wasn't just a great attacking display but also off the ball we saw intense counter pressing which prevented Atleti from creating any dangerous counter attacks, also the fact that both our wingers stayed wide helped Balde and Kounde leave less space behind them in transitions. 

In their build-up scenarios, we used our usual pressing structure, with wingers pressing their CBs, Lewandowski and Gavi marking their pivots, and fullbacks like Balde or Kounde stepping up to press when they try to build from wide areas. 

Despite Kounde being sometimes late in the pressing, Gavi and Raphinha relentless work rate compensated, ensuring perfect pressing. So it was a dominant 1st half—complete control , excellent attacking balance resulting to a lead that could've been bigger if we took our chances. 

3/ The Second Half
With Atletico trailing, they pressed higher and attacked more in the second half. Pedri’s brilliant press resistance on the left and Raphinha staying wide to support Kounde in the buildup were key to beating their press. 

However, the team became more direct, sacrificing some control. Despite this, we continued creating chances through Raphinha and Fermín's runs, combined with Pedri’s creativity. Unfortunately, poor finishing once again cost us the chance to secure the game. 