I respect all that you do @EBL2017 but please stop regurgitating old news.

Not once against Newcastle did the CCB invert into midfield, instead we opted for a 2-4 deep buildup shape with Licha and Mazraoui at FB, Maguire and MDL at CB with a pivot of Mainoo and Case.

↓ 

At times Mazraoui tucked into the midfield to facilitate Amad dropping wide.

Occasionally, Maguire stayed in a 3 on the edge of his box (not in midfield - staggered with Casemiro) but this was mosty done when Newcastle failed to sustain pressure.

↓ 

This ‘inverting into midfield’ wasn’t prevalent against Wolves either so i’m not sure where you are coming from?

I acknowledge that there are tactical flaws in Amorim’s build up structure, but to keep persisting about something that he has already adapted is strange. @EBL2017

Barcelona's In Possession Concerns

Barcelona 2-2 Atalanta

🧵 #BARATA 

Barcelona had complete control but never total dominance tonight.

They looked to play direct, with the 2 tricky wingers, Raphinha and Yamal, as the primary outlets. They did this by controlling from deep, circulating the ball within their 2-4 base (3-4 including GK) until an opportunity arose.

De Jong was the facilitator of this, always making himself available for the pass, and regularly dropping between the CBs forming a back 3. This gave Barca a numerical overload in the defensive 3rd, but they failed to put it to good use.

They looked to create artificial transitions, with Lewandowski dropping deep and the wingers running in behind - a solid counter-movement. When they received a pass, they relied on moments of brilliance from the wingers, which showed, specifically with Lamine Yamal. The front 3 were incredibly fluid where at times, the 2 wingers occupied the same side of the pitch, creating an overload.

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗹𝗲𝗺

Gasperini set Atalanta up with a man-to-man press. As most of Barca's movement/fluidity was within the front line, they couldn't manipulate the press by dragging the central players away to create passing lanes. Atalanta covered all the space that Barca wanted to exploit with this setup.

Additionally, with Barca's overload in the deep areas, it left the front line isolated. This meant that when they were able to play a ball through Atalanta's press, it was usually received by a man in white.

When Atalanta did win the ball, they were very high up the pitch. This significantly increased their goal threat in transition, as compared to if they won it back deeper.

𝗕𝗮𝗿𝗰𝗲𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗮'𝘀 𝗔𝗱𝗮𝗽𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀

In the 2nd half, Barcelona committed more men into the forward line, mostly seen with Gavi moving from a #10 role to more of a second striker next to Lewandowski. This drew Atalanta deeper and allowed Barca to gain more control in the final 3rd (although it still wasn't seen regularly enough). It also increased Barca's likelihood of getting on the end of the direct passes upfield, as they had more numbers across the forward line.

In this frame, we can see how it removes Ederson (marking Gavi) from Barca's deeper area, reducing the congestion and opening up passing lanes.

𝗣𝗼𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝗼𝗹𝘂𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀

If Flick wants to play a more direct style, they need more fluidity in the midfield areas. With static movement and predictable rotations, Atalanta couldn't be broken down centrally. Gasperini's press could be manipulated by rotating the midfielders (specifically Gavi and Pedri) into wider areas, as De Jong drops deep. This would open up central passing lanes into Lewandowski.

In this game, I would have liked to have seen Barcelona use the final 3rd more. They could progress in a less direct manner - which is definitely possible with the quality that they have - before using the fluid front 3 in the final 3rd. With this, it would pull apart a deep block, providing opportunities to penetrate with advancing runs from the fullbacks or the other winger (when both occupying the same side).

𝗲𝗻𝗱

𝘽𝙧𝙪𝙣𝙤 𝙁𝙚𝙧𝙣𝙖𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙨 𝙪𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙧 𝙍𝙪𝙗𝙚𝙣 𝘼𝙢𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙢

Tactical, Technical, and Psychological Overview.

(𝙄𝙣𝙨𝙞𝙙𝙚 𝙁𝙤𝙧𝙬𝙖𝙧𝙙)

🧵

#MUFC 

So far, Bruno Fernandes has started every game under Ruben Amorim, 2 in the pivot and 3 in the inside forward role.

In this thread, we will discuss Bruno’s role in what will likely be his primary position – the inside forward. 

𝙍𝙪𝙗𝙚𝙣 𝘼𝙢𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙢 builds up in a 3-2-5 shape, like many teams nowadays. This consists of a double pivot and two inside forwards (or 10s), where the wing backs hold the width.

Let's discuss Bruno's role as an inside forward in this 𝘽𝙪𝙞𝙡𝙙-𝙪𝙥 structure ↓ 

The 30-year-old is told to drop next to the midfield two.
Here, a player is pulled away from their desired position, and space is created, which can be exploited by various players such as Hojlund.
If he receives the ball, he can carry out multiple actions. 

This includes acting as a wall and giving the ball straight back to the CB.
This can shift the opposition’s structure which may open up areas of the pitch to progress into, additionally allowing the option for third-man combinations. 

Another frequent action is his interplay with the wingback (commonly Amad). He often receives and then lays the ball off to him.
Afterward, Bruno instantly provides an underlap, pulling a player away from the centre of the pitch and facilitating Amad's drift inwards -- Threat 

A similar automatism is laying the ball off to the CM (commonly Ugarte), who tends to drive into the space created by Bruno's movement.
This space can be used for several goal-creating opportunities such as playing a forward in behind or combing with attackers. 

Comparably, The Magician occasionally drops into a wider position with the wing-back advancing. This varies the build-up posing new threats for the opponents to counteract -- Disruption

He is very good at noticing when this movement is needed. 

Other actions are usually environmentally based, such as trying to turn on the defender and run into space or exploiting an area of weakness.

His awareness and intelligence are demonstrated in these actions.

𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙖𝙡-𝙏𝙝𝙞𝙧𝙙 𝙋𝙡𝙖𝙮

Bruno is vital in the final third play.
He is all over the forward line, especially on the edge of the box, attempting to cross or combine with his teammates in tight areas.

His creativity is shown in these areas. 

He makes runs into the box to provide another option for the cross when the ball is on the opposite flank.

His runs are contrary to Hojlund's in case an opportunity arises for him to take a shot, whether it’s a direct cross, a keeper spilling it, or a ball across goal. 

This movement also ensures that he doesn't interfere with Hojlund's dynamics.

From time to time, Bruno retracts his run, dropping into space for a cut-back, notably being seen with his goal against Forest.
This separates him from retreating defenders, for an easy pass into him. 

- 𝙐𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙧𝙡𝙖𝙥𝙨 + 𝙊𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙡𝙖𝙥𝙨

Similarly to what was said earlier in '𝘽𝙪𝙞𝙡𝙙-𝙪𝙥' underlaps occur in the final third. This causes havoc for the defensive block, where United can capitalize. 

It also provides a direct passing option from the wingback, advancing the play. 

Furthermore, the WB benefits from Fernandes’ movement as it pulls away players from vital areas, where he can then drive into, or play a straight pass into the showing forwards. 

Another quality of his is overlapping the WB. 

If the WB needs support, Bruno is willing to make a run away from the central areas to provide support for them in the form of an overlap. 
Once again, this can provide another passing option and creates confusion between the DFs.

𝘿𝙚𝙛𝙚𝙣𝙨𝙞𝙫𝙚 𝙍𝙚𝙨𝙥𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙞𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙚𝙨

In a mid-block, Bruno occupies a narrowing position, as the full-backs are deeper and wider.
This naturally means that there are minimal gaps in the centre of the field, so the opposing team is made to advance using the width↓ 

This plays into United’s hands as it forces them into less threatening positions, where they are then doubled up on by the inside forward (Bruno).
Bruno's incredible work-rate means that he is back defending more often than not.

Additionally, when caught in transition, Bruno is always one of the first back, showing his dedication not just to himself, but to the team as a whole.

Bruno is selfless.

𝙋𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙨𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙍𝙚𝙨𝙥𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙞𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙚𝙨

As we know, Bruno has an incredible work rate, as demonstrated by his energetic pressing approach.

In Amorim’s system, as an inside forward, Bruno tends to cover the half-space area out of possession 

The press is triggered when the defender on his side receives the ball, as Fernandes curves his run to block the passing lane out wide to the fullback.
This forces the opposition infield, where a CM steps up onto the receiver who is swarmed by United’s forwards. 

This can cause mistakes from the opposing midfielder, or they must play the ball backward, not successfully progressing the play.

In this phase, Bruno retreats and attempts to block the pass into the wide player: 

𝙄𝙣𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙞𝙨𝙩𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙞𝙚𝙨 + 𝙇𝙞𝙢𝙞𝙩𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨

Bruno’s physical footballing ability is world-class, alongside his mentality and work rate, but his limiting factor is his often irrational play.

A lack of composure.

When the team is under pressure, as the captain, the midfielder needs to bring calmness and try to slow the tempo down to alleviate any pressure. 
Instead, he looks for the long ball in an attempt to create a chance out of nothing. ↓ 

These passes are very unlikely to come off, giving the ball back to the opposition and putting the pressure right back onto United.  This is a very big issue for United as a team, and it means that when under sustained pressure, they crumble and struggle to play out. 

I would've liked to go into more detail but unfortunately, I can only post 20 in a thread, each with a character limit as I do not yet have X premium.

I hope you enjoyed it either way! 
If you did, likes and RTs are greatly appreciated.

&lt;𝙚𝙣𝙙&gt; 

I really like the dynamics of Bournemouth's CB partnership – Huijsen x Zabarnyi

Against Chelsea, it stood out how two-footed the pair are - so much so that they swapped sides at halftime.

Short Thread 🧵 #CHEBOU

In the first half, Bournemouth focused on keeping the CBs on the ball high, while overloading the half-spaces before progressing into these areas.
Having a naturally right-footed CB on the right and an extremely good left foot on the left means that the angle of the pass is superior.

Chelsea picked up on this and started to counter Bournemouth's strategies by overloading these areas themself, and by the end of the half, they were constantly denying progression.

In the second half, Huijsen moved to RCB and Zabarnyi to LCB. This meant a right-footer on the left and an extremely two-footed player on the right.

Bournemouth dropped the CBs deeper when on the ball and used the goalkeeper more often. They left their forwards high to stretch the play creating openings to exploit.

The CBs looked to play lofted switches of play to a wide man or in the opposite half-space. This dynamic (of wrong-footedness) gave a better passing angle.
When passing to a wide man, the inswinging curvature of the ball allows them to take their first touch inwards into space.
When switching into the half-space, the movement of the ball facilitates a flick-on in behind for the striker to run onto.

O.

O.

O.

O.

O.