Chelsea haven't won in four Premier League games but I'm unsure my admiration for Maresca could be any higher.

As a coach, he has the qualities to compete with the absolute elites, both with and without the ball.

Just need to get recruitment right (hasn't been flawless so far). 

Lots of talk about Acheampong starting and injuries and a lack of depth but Maresca signed Tosin.

He also brought João Félix in who is not an ideal option because he doesn't lead the press to play centrally and can't hold the width as a winger.

Talent is clear but a misfit.

However, it is abundantly clear that there were likely other factors involved in these deals that were out of Maresca's control..

Chelsea were a mess in the market before his arrival because they had no set style which meant their approach was to sign players with no clear idea.

Last season, I talked very highly of Ange.

This season, I am talking very highly of Maresca, and Chelsea have been even more impressive tactically.

Yet I always included a caveat when discussing Ange's potential - we need more evidence.

We got that in the summer and he failed.

This isn't to say he can't turn it around or make up for his errors at Spurs, because of course he can, but the same questions will be asked of Maresca..

Will he identify the necessary solutions in the transfer market to help this Chelsea team go from 'potential' to winners?

It's the next step.

Chelsea need more physicality and reliability.

Maresca keeps talking about guys like Madueke being unreliable - no doubting his quality or tactical fit but there is never a second of doubt that the elites will be relentless with their day-to-day intensity.

Aside from that, the midfield needs more physicality.

When Lavia and Caicedo play together it is well balanced, but when Enzo comes in and Palmer is in there too it can be soft, especially with Sancho and Madueke on the sides.

Just not enough defensively-minded warriors..

Even in the last 4 defeats Chelsea had control (aside from Fulham).

That control was created thanks to Maresca's tactics and the team's collective technical quality.

But other Premier League teams are really, really good and have the quality to punish you in any moment.

It is in these moments where the likes of Saliba, van Dijk, Maguire, Rúben Dias and the top defenders in the league win their 1v1 duels.

We can talk tactics and control all we like but these guys (and other defenders + goalkeepers) have to step up at least once per game.

There may not even be any direct or blatant individual errors, but these types of elite-level defenders stop situations that other defenders don't stop.

Chelsea keep throwing points away in moments.

This comes back to their lack of mental and physical steel - not tough enough..

What is really, really encouraging, though, is that Maresca has consistently referred to Chelsea's lack of physicality, their ill-discipline at times, and the need for new additions.

That along with his tactics and leadership suggests that he will become a truly elite manager.

It is difficult to be concrete with that prediction because recruitment will ultimately decide the outcome of Maresca's tenure at the club, but I have no doubting his tactical qualities and things like this.

Chelsea are almost always given the best chance to win thanks to him.

To solve Arsenal's 'attacking problems', Mikel Arteta has implemented a new tactical shape.

Let's review it.

A thread 👇 

Arsenal's new shape has been coined the 3-diamond-3.

Instead of a fullback inverting into the pivot, the emphasis lies on Ødegaard to connect the defence and attack together as he drops from high to low.

His movements trigger others to occupy different lanes in the front 5. 

We can see an example of that here.

Ødegaard drops to create a situational double pivot which is the cue for Arsenal's forwards to occupy the 5 lanes in attack.

Who occupies where is where the fluidity comes in.

Jesus/Havertz + Lewis-Skelly/Trossard interchanged roles a lot. 

Ødegaard's dropping movements from high to low are particularly difficult to stop because Arsenal often use their #9 to occupy the ball-side centre back (who's role is often to press Ødegaard).

For example, on the far-side, Trossard is tracked by the centre back in the pocket. 

Alternatively, for Ødegaard, Jesus occupies the centre half which allows Øde to drop freely outside the lines and overload the opposition's press.

And, off the back of receiving in these moments, he can receive face forwards on his left foot into a front 5.

Hugely threatening.. 

The plus side of Arteta's new system is that Arsenal can attack in more unpredictable ways with their fluidity between the lines and Ødegaard receiving in midfield areas with the ball on his left foot, the whole pitch ahead of him, and 5 ahead of him despite dropping low.

The negative aspect of the system comes in the defensive transition moment, though..

Although Ødegaard's dropping movements can create a 3-2 base which is an ideal occupation of spaces for the 'defence behind the attack', he doesn't always do it in traditional central areas.

So, as described, Ødegaard drops outside the lines as opposed to centrally into the block.

He can &amp; does drop centrally into the block, but he primarily drops outside the shape.

As a consequence of that, Arsenal still largely only have 1 player in deep midfield for transitions.

Partey could not manage the spaces either side of him in transition as a result of that and Palace had quite a bit of success on the turnover.

Where this will look better for Arsenal is when Declan Rice comes into the #6.

It is in these moments where the balance will be good.

Declan Rice has the mobility, running power, size, and temperament of the best pure defensive midfielder in the world, and that's because that is exactly what he is.

Alright, he will be asked to defend a little too much space on occasion, but the trade off makes total sense.

Arsenal directly improve their attack and become even more dynamic and difficult to stop whilst having the best pure defensive midfielder in the world ready to stifle counter-attacks alongside some of the most reliable &amp; mobile defenders alive.

System = top solution from Arteta.

Maguire clogs the middle and increases the passing distances between De Ligt and Martinez for Onana.

It often results in Onana playing a long, slow and predictable pass to a centre back on the side and the opposition can easily pin United in.

Too many con's for United here. 

The idea behind inverting the middle centre back is to create extra time for Onana in possession. Maguire inverts and it creates a passing lane for Onana.

It allows United to build in a back 3 with the outside centre halves wide and Onana in the middle, like how ten Hag did it.

But I'm unsure if creating a passing lane to your goalkeeper is a necessary tactical ploy at the expensive of close proximity in the build-up and clogging central lanes.

In fact, I'm not unsure about it. I'm adamant that it's not a sensible ploy.

It harms the team quite a lot..

Ten Hag did it in Holland &amp; Amorim did it in Sporting.

But they rarely had goal kicks in domestic competitions because they dominated the opposition.

And their teams excel in the high build, at counter-pressing &amp; pressing from opposition goal kicks.

You must earn control here.

Inverting the middle centre back so you can recycle to your goalkeeper and come out on the other side can make sense against teams that you have total control against.

But not against special teams (like most PL or CL teams).

I'll say it again - you must EARN control here.

Fulham vs Manchester United.

Half-time tactical analysis 👇

Fulham become a 3-2-5 with the ball as Castagne tucks in and Robinson moves high on the left.

United match up well with that in their off-ball shape (5-2-3).

United haven't always got their press right, though. Sometimes the #6's are passive, sometimes the last line is.

United can match up and apply maximum pressure from restarts but they find it difficult to do so in open play when things are more fluid &amp; the last line struggle to back up the press.

Then issues arise when the top end of the pitch don't apply pressure but the last line is high. 

With the ball, Mazraoui's inversions have helped United get control on the left-hand side of their build-up.

Wilson man-marks Mazraoui which has freed up time and space for Maguire + Martinez.

On the far-side Iwobi shadow marks the lane to the #8 AND presses. Wilson only marks. 

It's an interesting tactical battle and most of United's best moments have come down their left as a consequence of this tactical ploy from Amorim.

It has freed up Garnacho to receive high &amp; wide.

But outside of that issues persist with little-to-no rotations on the other side.

We can attribute some of United's issues in the high build to a lack of quality, but there is a clear lack of dynamism because there is little rotation across the pitch.

Outside of Mazraoui's inversions their positioning is rigid.

Very little in the way of fluid rotations..

The double pivot are 'set' positionally. Amad and Dalot very rarely interchange.

It's only Mazraoui and Garnarcho that are providing any sort of dynamism.

Other top teams have guys inverting into midfield and rotating in wide triangles.

Amorim's team are in set &amp; rigid roles..

The issues with the ball in tandem with the inconsistency of United's press has seen Amorim's team have 0 shots so far.

The commentator said that is only the 4th time that has happened in 20 years for United.

Issues remain (even though Mazraoui's inversions have been helpful).

Ruben Amorim's tactical system has some clear flaws, irrespective of the player-based issues at Manchester United.

The press is either passive or disjointed due to the natural deficiencies of pressing with 5 in the last line.

And the build-up can be easy to nullify..

A thread. 

Bournemouth.

Double pivot with low-lying fullbacks.

Amorim's United can't get pressure on the ball because their wingbacks are pinned back by Bournemouth's wingers which means United wide players must manage the fullbacks.

Clear central 2v1 vs Zirkzee. All day on the ball. 

Amorim's team try to apply pressure on the ball regardless as Mainoo and Ugarte jump to Bournemouth's #6's.

Man-marking in midfield with little pressure on the ball in the first lines makes absolutely no sense because it opens up clear passing lanes into the front. 

Amorim would have wanted Maguire to be more aggressive to back up the press in this moment, and that could have applied much more effective pressure to the ball if he did, but quite often centre backs aren't able to or comfortable to pressing #10 and #8's dropping in this moment.

Regardless, as a result of United's total lack of pressure on the ball and wide open block, Bournemouth penetrate with ease.

Here we can see Maguire in no man's land, the two #6's caught ahead of the ball, and both wingbacks pinned back by the Bournemouth wingers.

Issues. 

Let's look at another example of how Amorim's defensive structure can be exploited.

Bournemouth's #6 drops into the first line of build-up.

United are unsure of what to do but they try to get pressure on the ball anyway which ends up forcing Bournemouth back.

Okay, right?! 

Wrong.

United get the press wrong again as Zirkzee jumps the goalkeeper which leaves Ugarte with an impossible decision to make - jump to the #6 or stay with the #8?

Either way, Bournemouth have a spare man.

They find him with ease and run through the middle of United's pitch. 

What is arguably an even bigger concern than the press getting bypassed, though, is the consequences that can occur off the back of it.

On the face of it, United are vulnerable in transition after being bypassed in the press, but there are much bigger problems that arise..

Manchester United don't want to be sitting in a 5-4-1 block at home to any team, let alone Bournemouth (as good as they are).

However, because of the club's selection of Amorim, this is what they expected at times.

So, at least when they do, you would expect them to be compact. 

But they weren't.

United were caught between trying to apply pressure to the ball &amp; defending in a 5-4-1.

Again, we saw moments where the collective was not on the same page.

Mainoo jumps to the centre half. Martinez jumps into midfield. Clear 3v2 in midfield for Bournemouth.. 

Little pressure on the ball with your #6 and centre half jumping out of position is not a good look.

And, before you guys start, save me the xG narrative around the game.

These issues occurred at 0-0.

But, more importantly, they also occurred for Amorim at Sporting Lisbon.

See here.

Sporting lack pressure on the ball.

The wingback is pinned, the centre halves don't want to jump, the #6 is overloaded, and the winger doesn't want to jump to the centre half because there is a low-lying fullback beside him.

Free men in front of AND between the team. 

Combine this with the fact that United defend with 5 which makes them A) less of a transitional threat, B) worse in the press, and C) less threatening when they do sustain attacks and issues become clear.

They defend with 5 but don't even do it all that effectively.

Big issues.

United will improve once they sort out the gaping player quality issues in the squad, but these are structural flaws that not even the elites can make up for in a Premier League at its current level.

Especially when there are structural issues with the ball too..

Amorim's build-up structure is quite easy to press despite the fact that United have some special technicians in that phase.

The middle centre half positions themselves with their back to goal at the edge of the box. They don't want the ball here.

And you can't blame 'em. 

So Bournemouth simply invite the pass to the side of the middle centre half, press aggressively as soon as Martinez receives whilst shadow marking the passing lane into the situational #6's and condensing the play to one side.

This forces United long or to play into pressure. 

Martinez goes long in this moment which plays into Bournemouth's hands because they defended zonally which means that they have numbers to win 1st and 2nd balls in this scenario.

Lots of teams press in man-to-man fashion now.

But there's not really a need to vs Amorim's United. 

Most #6's want the ball in this moment so they can bridge out to the fullback and help their team evade the press.

But centre backs in midfield certainly don't show for the ball in this position, especially when they are playing on the same side as their weak foot. 

For Ruben Amorim to succeed at Manchester United, these tactical flaws must be addressed.

In the ultra high quality Premier League, even minor tactical chinks in the armoury of a team get exposed, let alone gaping holes like the ones Amorim's system has.

Hopefully he solves it. 

Arne Slot has had some consistent issues in the high press against 3-2-5 shapes.

He admitted that post-Chelsea, though, and adapted from that moment to press with superior quality against the likes of Leipzig who built that way.

Yet, Amorim's United nullified them.

A thread 🔴 

Here we see Salah jump to Martinez.

As he jumps he signals for Trent to back up the press by jumping to Dalot.

Trent doesn't jump, though, because he is pinned back by Bruno Fernandes on the sides.

So, Dalot receives possession with time and space and United easily escape. 

This was a consistent theme throughout the game, so much so that Salah got visibly frustrated with Trent.

United got out time and time again with simple passes to Dalot, whether they be clipped, via third man combinations (a bounce pass from the #6 to Dalot, or a pass from a CB. 

This wasn't the only issue Liverpool had in the press, though.

Amorim's team had a consistent 3v2 in the first lines of build-up because Liverpool only pressed with Diaz and Salah.

It was quite simple for United to find the spare man via direct passes or third man combinations. 

United had such easy control of the game with the ball in these types of moments.

They had time and space on the ball in the first lines thanks to the 3v2 overload and Trent was regularly pinned into the last line which meant it was easy to progress play to Dalot.. 

Gakpo's role was the issue.

Slot had him tracking back into the last line because Diallo was pinning Robertson inside the pitch.

So we saw this picture at times with Liverpool defending with 5 in the last line.

To bring Gakpo back this far is overly cautious. 

Liverpool were too respectful of United's qualities and allowed them to excel in the one moment where Amorim's team does excel (in the 3-2-5 high build).

The set-up was different to the one's that Liverpool had against prior 3-2-5 high builds, though, so let's explore that..

Slot prefers to keep a +1 in the last line so his idea when pressing is often to force the opposition to one side with the far-side wide player collapsing the player on the far-side #6, thus leaving the fullback on the opposite side of the pitch free.

A standard &amp; sensible idea. 

But in the mid-block is where Liverpool have had issues in these games, not from opposition goal kicks.

Liverpool don't jump their centre backs to press the #8's between the lines so it means they press with 6 versus 7.

This is fine, but Klopp pressed in these areas in a 4-3-3. 

The front 3 can press the back 3, the #8's can jump to the #6's, and the #6 can stay in between the two #8's, and once the ball goes to one side he can jump to press the ball-side #8.

The far-side #8 (or centre back if the winger tucks in) is the spare man, but hard to access... 

The 4-4-2, however, is more exploitable.

A 4-2-3-1 can work if one of the front 2 drop to mark the #6, the wingers invert to press the centre backs alongside the #9, and one #6 jumps to the opposition #6 with the other managing both #8's.

But the 4-4-2 can be overloaded.. 

So, in Liverpool's next game after the Chelsea one against Leipzig, Slot pressed in more of a Klopp-esque shape.

4-3-3, push to one side and trap them there, but if the opposition recycle and come out on the far-side the winger is inverted &amp; the far-side fullback is on the jump. 

Against United, Trent did release once to back up the press after Liverpool forced them to one side (with Konaté jumping to Bruno).

This applied maximum pressure to the ball and pinned United in.

But it only happened once.

I go back to it - Slot's plan was too passive overall. 

Liverpool paid too much respect to United. Gakpo should have been higher to help put more pressure on the ball and Trent should have been given more license to jump to put pressure on the ball.

Slot's passive pressing cost Liverpool the game more so than any individual players..

I can even go back to the City game at Anfield.

Alright, Liverpool smashed them in a totally dominant performance, but in terms of pure tactics, Liverpool's press was relatively passive structurally.

City lacked balance at the top end of the pitch so couldn't get out, though.

But that was self-inflicted from Guardiola as opposed to something special from Slot tactically.

The press is by no means bad, and it is typically good, but at times this season Slot's passive pressing has cost Liverpool control &amp; consequentially, points.

Something to improve.. 

Dyche's Everton often pressed in man-to-man fashion from opposition goal kicks, yet against the big 6 they defended more passively.

This often saw them get great success in both moments against all types of teams.

Issues arose in open play pressing &amp; when Everton had the ball.

Dyche's team were a little too passive in the mid-block.

They were too willing to let the opposition have the ball in these moments.

&amp; when they had the ball they transitioned to a fluid 4-3-3 kind of shape this season but the balance never really worked. It was too player-led.

However, in saying that, Everton were always one of the toughest teams to play against.

They very rarely lost games by a number of goals, and even when they did there were contextual factors (luck) that could have saw them win the game on another day (United away/Brighton home).

Injuries and underperformance hurt them as well - Branthwaite was injured a lot and Calvert-Lewin hasn't been as reliable as he typically is.

These factors made Everton less dominant in the moments that matter the most to them (winning duels, defending the box, and transitions).

Sacking Dyche is incredibly harsh, and the timing is especially weird considering the unlikelihood of Everton being relegated with him in charge.

However, if reports are true about his dwindling belief in the project, then the new owners were left with no choice, really.

What Everton need now is a coach who prioritises defending (ironically, like Dyche).

Someone who can encapsulate what the club is all about - direct, fast-paced, physical, hard-working, and compact.

The modern day version of that is a high pressing coach.

Everton have tried to modernise the club in recent years with 'household' names as managers but when things have gone pear-shaped they have often gone wrong when picking more pragmatic managers.

Think Allardyce or Benitez - Dyche is the modern day version of these guys though.

I say this because Allardyce and Benitez let the opposition build from goal kicks.

So does David Moyes.

Dyche is also a 4-4-2 specialist but he is more modern in his defensive approach because of how aggressive he can be in settled pressing moments (why Burnley often did well).

But, in the same breadth, Nuno is in the top 4 with Nottingham Forest and they don't press high from goal kicks, and David Moyes won a European Cup with West Ham a few years ago.

Ultimately, if Everton get the right personnel, they can succeed with an old-school coach (Moyes).

Everton may be less tactically complete when doing so, but if the likes of Calvert-Lewin kick on, Ndiaye continues to do what he's doing and the rest of the team come together, then I back the group to succeed with a couple of additions in key areas.

New owners can provide that.

But, it's a bit of a catch-22.

Theoretically, Dyche is an ideal coach for the current group.

The club would have been smart to try and keep him until the end of the season before hiring a coach with a higher ceiling &amp; building around that instead of committing to something now.

In saying that, though, we have to be incredibly open-minded in this game.

I always talk about control and how it's the best way to win football matches in the long-run.

But Villa got top 4 without pressing much. Forest are on course for it now too. And look what Leicester did.

It's not how I believe football should be played because it inherently gives up control, but when you have top penalty box defenders, excellent discipline and physicality in midfield, and top transitional attackers, then anything can happen.

Forest are showing this every week.

Everton already have the base of this in their squad.

With one or two top additions they can soar.

But, admittedly, the age profile of the squad is an issue. They have the oldest XI, on average, in the Premier League.

Investment will be needed to maintain and THEN to push on..

Maresca needs to improve Chelsea's XI (aerial dominance at right centre half, physicality in midfield, and reliability in attack in terms of work ethic).

There is no denying that Sancho/Madueke/Felix/Nkunku are top players but unsure on their defensive behaviours &amp; reliability..

So, on top of having to make improvements to the first XI, Maresca and Chelsea may have to replace already good players with similarly good players which won't necessarily raise the level so much.

It will help standards, culture, etc, but not so much in terms of quality.

The reason I tweet this is because it makes me think that maybe Maresca and Chelsea are not as close as we think to challenging at the top end of the Premier League.

Still lots of work to be done in terms of cleaning up the squad, improving the XI.

Lots of good business needed.

Martinelli is in a 1v1 situation in the box.

He pulls it back to Ødegaard who is in a TOP position to shoot.

Instead of shooting on his right foot, he takes his first touch with his left foot, turns AWAY from goal, &amp; shoots into a crowd of bodies.

Sums up his offensive issues. 

If that is De Bruyne, Szoboszlai, Gibbs-White, Bellingham, etc, etc, they are all capable of shooting on both feet AND providing an overlapping run.

They have a variety of solutions to choose from.

Ødegaard can't overlap and can't use his right foot.

It's why he's better deep.

Dyche's idea against the 3-2-5 is consistent.

4-5-1, #9 divides the 'press', #8's lock on to the #6's, wingers block the passing lanes into the half spaces, #6 screens.

Leaves lot of responsibilities on the fullbacks to manage 1v1's.

Also for the wingers + #6 to track runs. 

It's a defensive approach which often lacks pressure in the first lines of the opposition's build-up which is why Everton can concede a lot of possession in these games.

But it's back to back 0-0's against Arsenal/Chelsea.

See, the last line engagement is actually quite high. 

Not so high that Everton are vulnerable to balls in behind, and not so passive against it in the midfield lines that teams can easily access these areas before playing quickly in behind.

It prevents teams from simply sustaining pressure.

They hold possession in deep build-up.

It's masterful coaching and is partly enabled by Everton's qualities when they 'close and kick'.

Pickford kicks it quite far + they have lots of physicality in midfield and attack to compete, get the team up the pitch and to carry in transition (Ndiaye - a really nice addition).

Where frustration can mount for Everton fans with Dyche is with how passive it *can* be though in terms of high pressing.

Dyche is capable of implementing top class presses.

It's an underrated trait of his.

And Everton *could* match up against teams like this more often. 

But the thing about it is they don't.

When the opposition circulate along the first line Everton's wingers *could* jump to get pressure on the ball when the opposition #8 is in midfield and not in the last line (in these moments they have to track all the way back into defence).

If Everton defended in more of a 4-2-3-1 and let two #6's manage the opposition #8's they could try to release their wingers more often to get pressure on the ball.

It ain't Dyche's preference, though, and I can see why because they often do well against the top teams.

There is more to extract out of this Everton group, though. They have creativity, guile, dynamism, athleticism, hard-working players, &amp; midfielders who can pass and put their foot on the ball.

Would like to see more consistent aggression from Dyche. Conceding territory is risky.

Andy Robertson: “Arne Slot tweaks our role in every single game. Tactically he is unbelievable!”.

Liverpool's fullbacks are the key to their success, with Trent Alexander-Arnold being the creative hub.

Let's assess how Slot uses Liverpool's fullbacks.. 👇

A Tactical THREAD! 🚨

Here we see Robertson and Bradley in low-lying fullback positions against Real Madrid.

Ancelotti's team defended in a 4-4-2 and it was the role of their wide midfielders to get pressure on Liverpool's fullbacks.

When they did, Liverpool had clear solutions to bypass the press. 

Take this moment, for example.

Bellingham jumps to Bradley and he has a variety of options to hit.

He can play into Salah who is coming to feet, into the channel to find Jones running from deep or directly into Núñez in the #9.

This is made possible because of the positioning. 

So often teams play with fullbacks inside the pitch.

But with Liverpool playing their fullbacks in low and wide positions they create lots of passing lanes into the front.

Gravenberch is their only #6 so between the front 3 and the #8's there's lot of progressive options.

We can see Liverpool's 4-1 build here.

So often we see a 3-2 shape which can condense the middle of the pitch and block the passing lanes into the front.

Liverpool have elite serving qualities from fullback positions to exploit these spaces that are open for them. 

Most interestingly, though, Arne Slot is incredibly adaptable.

He has no problem adapting during games if he feels that there is a superior alternative to the aforementioned idea.

For example, against Real Madrid, Slot pushed Bradley on between the lines at half-time.

This was because Liverpool consistently outnumbered Madrid's press and sustained pressure with ease all half.

Not only that, but they also kept 5 players behind the ball to manage Madrid's transitions, but with no Vinicius Jr. on the pitch Slot adapted his structure.

Instead of building with 5, Liverpool began to build with 4 and attacked with an extra number in the last line.

This tactical tweak led directly to Liverpool finding the breakthrough in this game with Bradley assisting Mac Allister's goal. 

However, Liverpool primarily play with low fullbacks in a 4-1 structure, but the sheer fact that they are adaptable &amp; tweak the role of the fullbacks depending on how they opposition press/play each week speaks to the intelligence of Slot.

Subtle, but it makes a huge difference.

In the build-up, Liverpool's low fullbacks are equally as difficult to manage.

It's not common to see fullbacks *THIS* deep when teams play out from the back.

But the idea is simple:

1) Press them and Liverpool play over,
2) Leave them and Liverpool build through the pitch. 

For example, Spence jumps from fullback to pressurise Trent in a man-to-man press.

Because Trent is a total unicorn, he can play around the corner (with accuracy) into Liverpool's attack in 1v1 situations, leaving moments like THIS for them in an artificially created transition. 

Alternatively, if you sit off, Trent can kill you in 100 different ways, some of which being switches of play or balls in behind to willing runners.

Not to mention that Robertson and Bradley are similarly capable of playing decisive passes (although not quite to Trent's level). 

And, in the final third, it allows Trent to face the play so he can dictate attacks and create/cross from dangerous positions (like below).

Liverpool fans worried about Trent's impact/importance under Slot at the start of his tenure.

Turns out the system is built around him.. 

Slot has harnessed a special squad, but he has created optimal conditions from them to succeed.

If you press Liverpool, they are happy to play over.

If you sit off, they are happy to pin you back.

And, because of their low-lying fullbacks, they are a unique team to face. 

More simple but effective adjustments via fullbacks from Arne Slot.

Instead of Trent hanging low and Liverpool building in a 4-3-3, he played inside to create a free passing lane to Salah.

Makes more sense against West Ham who defend with 4 and pack the middle with their 4-5-1. 

What would Liverpool rather?

Liverpool's back-line trying to find passing lanes through West Ham's 4-5-1 block OR having easy access to the wingers and consistently attacking from high and wide positions against a back 4?

Easy answer. More ball Salah and Gakpo get the better.

Against a 4-2-3-1 it makes more sense to build in a 4-3-3.

When teams defend with 2 in midfield, there's more spaces to pass between the lines.

When they defend with 3, it's harder to play through, so go around them.

Very simple tactical adjustments from Slot, yet very smart.. 

Ruben Amorim stripped it back to basics yesterday:

- No playing out from the back from goal kicks.

- No pressing from Liverpool's goal kicks.

- &amp; when defending deep there was no confusion as to whether they were pressing or defending low, unlike the Newcastle game.

Sensible. 

This specific idea would suggest that United would have little possession, but that was not the case.

They held quite a lot of the ball and had good technical control in the game.

But I would argue that this is because of Liverpool's passive pressure more than anything else..

3v2 on the first line, Trent rarely jumping to Dalot, Gakpo defending as part of a back 5. Slot was far too respectful of United.

It allowed Amorim's team to excel in the moment where they are at their best tactically, in the 3-2-5 high build.

Liverpool let them play. 

For this reason, I would curb any enthusiasm on notion's that it was some sort of Amorim masterclass.

United fans are happy with the result and performance, and rightly so because their players gave it their all and played well, but I go back to it - Liverpool let them play.

Arne Slot said it himself post-game.

Manchester United played like Nottingham Forest (although this is too extreme, despite being true in certain senses).

Forest pushed everybody high and kicked long, didn't press from goal kicks, and focused on defending deep versus pressing..

United were obviously more expansive from that as they tried to play out from the back when they passed it back to Onana, they had lots of possession in the high build, &amp; they tried to get 'step-up-pressure' on the ball where possible.

But the comparison makes sense in general.

The focus in this game centres around Liverpool's lack of pressure on the ball.

It is the main tactical talking point.

United exploited that well, but that's not a surprise. They are at their best in the high build.

Overall, it was more so 'Liverpool bad' than 'United good'.

And, in terms of long-term trajectory, we have to acknowledge that it's a short-term solution to come away with something, but that is sensible.

To go to Anfield and to play and to press high all of the time is asking for trouble.

In a one-off game, the plan made sense.

The requirements to be a top class #9:

- Athleticism,
- Work rate,
- Determination to score,
- Ability to strike the ball,
- Technical quality,
- Ability to create separation,
- Positional discipline.

Højlund ticks every box here - Manchester United fans, stop doubting him. 

Højlund has had a difficult time as of late, but that's probably something got to do with the fact that United's record under Ruben Amorim has been pretty abysmal..

Not to mention how limited they are in the build-up, in the press, and in offensive moments where they lack speed.

So often United try to build, get pressed, and end up lofting loopy &amp; hopeful balls in the general direction of Højlund.

Sorry, but you have to drive the ball into his feet or into competitive areas for him to compete in the air.

Hanging it up for defenders makes it impossible.

It's also clear that even when United do get the ball into Højlund's feet that they lack numbers and quality in and around him.

Is there anybody in United's squad with unstoppable speed outside of Rashford? The attack is limited.

Not to forget that they only transition with 3..

United have also consistently struggled to get pressure on the ball.

When you struggle to build, press, and transition with quality well then you're really struggling because that's every phase of the game...

Højlund hasn't been perfect, but conditions are key to succeed.

We can talk about how others have excelled regardless of structural issues (like Amad, for example), but that's mainly because he was always a good player who has only been given a chance recently.

And the system suits him at both wingback and in the half space in the front 3.

But let's not act like Amad has been some sort of unstoppable force.

He has been top, but in moments when United suffer in games his influence dwindles, but that's normal because the collective's job is to empower the individual.

Højlund is not one I would criticise much.

His attitude has been a little bit questionable at times which has been my only disappointment with him.

Sometimes he sulks or throws his arms up in the air at teammates.

I do not like those traits, especially when things are not going well.

Leading by example is the solution.

And, see, many people would see the holes within United's block in these types of moments and think about how exploitable their press can be when the centre backs don't jump, and they are right to.

However, the implications are worse than that. It allows easy possession overall.

Let's take a look at some examples of that.

Here, Raya can clip to Timber or play a pass to Saliba.

Why?

Because although Timber is a fullback and Amorim's wingbacks often press this high, Timber's fluid positioning prevents them from doing so.

He clips over and uses the 2v1. 

Mason Mount works hard to backwards counter-press, but Timber can simply recycle to the vacated Saliba.

All of a sudden, Arsenal have all day in possession to carry the ball forwards and to start an attack.

See, the fluidity of Arsenal is very important to talk about as well. 

If Timber and Zinchenko were consistently pinned as deep-lying fullbacks in traditional fullback zones, United's wingbacks could reliably get up to them to apply pressure, but both Timber and Zinchenko invert.

So United's wingbacks are left pinned in the last line with wingers..

United's wingbacks can't jump against Arsenal's fullbacks, and their centre backs can't jump against Arsenal's dropping movements in central areas.

This means that instead of putting pressure on the ball, the front 5 are overloaded either behind them or in front of them. 

Defending with 5 in the last line prevents teams from getting reliable pressure on the ball against elite technical teams.

It is a very clear flaw within the tactic.

It makes it easy for teams to overload Amorim's system in the initial phases as players drop from high to low.

OKAY, with this in mind, we should have expected to see Arsenal wipe the floor with United in possession from the first until the last minute, right?

But that wasn't the case..

Why?

Because Arsenal were uncharacteristically poor technically, but they raised the level 2nd half.

As soon as the 2nd half started Arsenal came out all guns blazing and as a consequence of their ability to sustain pressure due to the clear overload in the build-up, they dominated proceedings.

It's also really important to talk about narratives surrounding Arsenal's defence.

This idea that Arsenal sat back behind the ball in cautious fashion is a complete and utter fallacy.

Guys, please. Arteta's Arsenal are one of the most aggressive pressing teams in the world but to press you MUST be good with the ball too.

1st half, they were not, and suffered.

Let's take a look at Arsenal's tactical intent in the press.

Here we see United in their 3-2-5 high build and Arsenal in their 4-4-2 block.

The idea is clear &amp; simple in this moment, but 'step-up pressure' was consistently applied.

Arsenal wanted to press really aggressively. 

We can see an example of that here which we saw countless times throughout the game.

When they feel the moment is right, one of the front 3 press their designated man in United's back 3.

This is the cue for the rest of the block to jump and to lock on in man-to-man fashion. 

Arsenal combined defending compactly in the deep defensive moment with defending with incredible aggression in the high press moment, and they sustained that throughout the game despite being poor technically in the first half which meant they sat more than they would have liked.

As for United's approach in possession, there is no doubt that there are impressive elements to it &amp; it is also key to note that Amorim improved United's build-up structure from goal kicks.

Instead of the middle centre half being redundant in the pivot, United built differently. 

The structure was similar, but De Ligt pushed out to right back which allowed Maguire to build centrally alongside Mazraoui.

This let United build with two natural midfielders in the pivot as opposed to a centre back awkwardly positioned with his back to goal in that area. 

However, on the back-pass, Maguire occupied positions like this which essentially made him redundant whilst blocking the passing lanes into midfield.

Instead of splitting either side of Onana, his positioning on the back-pass had little-to-no benefit..

This remains a concern. 

I have also talked about other issues with Amorim's style in the past, not just centred around the build-up with the centre half inverted or the likelihood of the press getting overloaded.

Although the 3-2-5 is great, the fact that wingbacks are reliant to play high is an issue.

Those very same wingbacks are often also pinned into the last line in the defensive moment.

For them to get up the pitch, they have to travel from low to high.

That takes time and it requires United to hold possession to get into their ideal attacking structure.

The difference between that and a back 4, for example, is that the wingers are already high.

Oh, and the sheer fact that they are wingers in the attacking moments - not wingbacks.

I know Amorim plays guys like Diallo there, but not on both sides.

One is very firmly a wingback.

And this idea of using automatisms and up-back-and-through patterns in the build-up makes a whole lot of sense, but the Premier League is so damn good, man.

I say this because most teams are incredible physically and tactically.

This means they are prepared for set patterns.

What makes City, Liverpool, Chelsea, and Arsenal so hard to play against is their fluidity.

Sometimes the fullback inverts, sometimes they are on the outside.

Sometimes the #8 drops from high to low, sometimes they stay high.

They are hard to prepare to play against.

Amorim's current style, on the other hand, is rigid.

The automatisms can work to a really good standard if implemented correctly, but they are predictable in an incredibly tactical league.

The reality of the situation is despite Amorim's overall qualities, his model is flawed.

In every phase there are issues:

Build-up, when sustaining pressure, when pressing high, when defending in the mid-block, even when transitioning because they are 5 defenders back as opposed to 4 which means there is 1 less player for the transitional moment.

Issues everywhere.

People will say that I am being too harsh and that he needs time and things like that, but please remember that I assessed and pointed out EVERY SINGLE ONE of these flaws before his very first game at Manchester United..

Yet, despite that, I did not say the appointment was poor.

That is because United have lacked an identity for years.

Amorim's current model, despite its flaws, provides an identity..

And, despite the issues within it in an ever-improving and evolving Premier League, it can see United become a very difficult team to face on every level.

Just look at Tuchel's Chelsea or Alonso's Leverkusen.

The model is similar to that, and look at what those clubs achieved.

The reason I have critiqued it in seemingly harsh fashion is because the standard to beat City, Arsenal, Liverpool and now Chelsea is so, so high. So high.

For United to get to that level, Amorim must evolve his model.

There are one too many flaws in his current system for player quality to overcome it.

Arsenal, on the other hand, are elite with and without the ball from a game model perspective, but that should be obvious by now. 

Arsenal were pressing with Timber pushed onto Spence and Sterling pressing Gray all game.

It was an incredibly brave and aggressive man-to-man idea.

But for the goal Ødegaard orchestrated Arsenal's press differently..

He told Timber to stay &amp; took the press into his own hands. 

Gray passed to Spence &amp; Sterling remained passive positionally to manage him, but to prevent the easy pass into Bissouma &amp; the pass back to Gray, Ødegaard started half way between them so he was in a position to press both.

Partey was also aggressively positioned to back him up. 

Spence tried to find Bissouma, Ødegaard and Partey double teamed to win the ball back, and seconds later Trossard makes it 2-1.

So often we talk about Ødegaard's qualities in possession but I would argue that his most valuable asset at Arsenal is his ability to lead the press. 

Here he instructs Timber to back it up &amp; Arsenal apply pressure differently.

The simple idea behind it is that Arsenal are fluid in their press, but they constantly remain compact &amp; try to apply maximum pressure.

Sometimes better to press centrally, other times from out-to-in.. 

A general rule of thumb is that the defender can release from the last line when the opposition are building deep.

But when they have possession in midfield areas the defender can't release from the last line as the ball is closer to goal.

That's when central pressure is key ⚽️

🟣🔴 Aston Villa vs Arsenal.

The aftermath — and what people aren’t talking about.

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THREAD! 🚨

Ruben Amorim.

Manchester United.

A rant.

🔻

Build-up:

United either close and kick, invert a centre back into midfield and play direct (which gives them an extra number for 2nd balls), or they try to pass to one side with the centre back inverted into midfield but they get

I forget to mention United’s throw ins.

Wingbacks take them so they lack bodies high.

They either throw into an underload or throw backwards into predictably positioned players (because the tactics never change).

There’s so many throw ins per game and United are awful at them.

Michael Carrick's Manchester United:

🔻 4-2-4 build-up
🔻 3-2-5 high
🔻 Fullbacks + wingers on different lines with #6's dropping either into the back 3 or outside the lines
🔻 Diamond press

This is the general approach he used at Middlesbrough as well (although he does tweak).

The remainder of the season will reveal the answer to the questions needed to assess if he is a legitimate long-term candidate for the role.

Carrick will provide balance with and without the ball. With top players, that offers Solskjaer-type success.

We are seeing that already.

But, to truly compete with the elites, Carrick must combine his balanced philosophy with top players AND elite tactics in one specific area.

Either in possession (City) or out of possession (Arsenal).

Liverpool have shown you can win without being flawless.

Fulham game is 🔐

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